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The Leidos Mixup and the 
Misunderstood Duty to Disclose in 
Securities Law 
Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody* 
Abstract 
This Article concerns the recent Supreme Court case, Leidos, 
Inc. v. Indiana Public Retirement System (Leidos), and examines 
the broader issues that it raised for securities law. The consensus 
among scholars and practitioners is that Leidos presented a direct 
conflict among the circuit courts over a core question of securities 
law—when a failure to comply with the SEC’s disclosure 
requirements can constitute fraud under Rule 10b-5. This Article 
provides a much different interpretation of the case. It begins by 
demonstrating that the circuit split which is presumed to have 
brought Leidos to the Supreme Court does not in fact exist. It then 
shows that, rather than being riddled with disagreement, the 
leading judicial analysis in this area of the law instead reflects a 
shared set of misconceptions about how the securities regulation 
architecture works.  
By unraveling the underlying sources of the Leidos mix-up, this 
Article makes three contributions. First, it identifies overlooked 
aspects of the disclosure rules at issue in Leidos, and provides a 
novel analysis of how the case should have been decided. Second, it 
explains how errors in leading interpretations of the legal 
authorities implicated in Leidos carry over to other prominent 
portions of the regulatory framework, namely Sections 11 and 12 of 
the 1933 Securities Act. Third, it demonstrates that a central yet 
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ill-defined securities doctrine—the duty to disclose—functions 
primarily to obscure rather than clarify the legal questions at issue 
in disclosure fraud claims. Taken together, these points suggest that 
Leidos was a more unusual case than has been appreciated, and 
stands at a remarkable confluence of legal and scholarly 
confusions, many of which implicate fundamental principles of 
securities law. 
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I. Introduction 
For its October 2017 term, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the case of Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Public Retirement 
System1 (Leidos), and thereby put itself on a course to address some 
of the most complex yet fundamental issues in securities 
regulation.2 In securities law jargon, the specific question 
presented in Leidos was whether a regulation issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Item 303 of 
Regulation S-K (Item 303), creates a duty to disclose that is 
actionable under the prohibition against securities fraud set forth 
in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 
Exchange Act) and the related Rule 10b-5.3 Stated more simply, 
the Court was asked to decide whether failure to comply with a 
disclosure mandate that is expressly stated in the SEC’s rules can 
constitute fraud.4 This is no small matter, given that corporate 
                                                                                                     
 1. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lohier, J.), 
cert. granted sub nom. Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) 
(No. 16-581) [hereinafter Lohier Op.]. 
 2. See id. at 88 (setting forth the four securities issues addressed by the 
Second Circuit). 
3.   See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 
No. 16-581 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2016) [hereinafter Leidos Cert. Pet.] (posing the question 
for certiorari and noting that the Second Circuit’s holding directly conflicted with 
the rulings of the Third and Ninth Circuits); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2017) 
(setting forth regulations for the discussion and analysis of financial conditions 
by management and the results of operations); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (codifying 
Section 10(b)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (codifying Rule 10b-5).  
 4. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at i (“The question presented is: 
Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding—in direct conflict with the decisions 
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disclosures to investors have been the cornerstone of modern 
securities regulation since they were established in the 1930s,5 and 
Item 303 in particular concerns one of the more important 
categories of information that public companies are called upon to 
produce: an overview of uncertainties facing a company’s financial 
future, known as “Management’s Discussion and Analysis” 
(MD&A).6 The controversies raised by Leidos will not be resolved 
through any statement by the Court, however, and remain open 
indefinitely as a doctrinal matter, due to a settlement of the case 
that was announced by the parties on the eve of oral argument.7 
                                                                                                     
of the Third and Ninth Circuits—that Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K creates a 
duty to disclose that is actionable under Section 10(b) . . . and SEC Rule 10b-5.”). 
 5. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39–40 (3d ed. 
2003) (noting the need for disclosure of data by firms involved in the securities 
markets following the stock market crash of the Great Depression). See generally 
James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959) (discussing the origins and legislative history of the 
Securities Act of 1933); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) 
(discussing the SEC and the need for expanded social disclosure requirements for 
public reporting companies in order to further social and financial transparency). 
 6. See generally Denise Voigt Crawford & Dean Galaro, A Rule 10b-5 
Private Right of Action for MD&A Violations?, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 1 (2015) 
(discussing “the use of Item 303 violations as a basis for a private cause of action 
under Rule 10b-5”); Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. 
L. REV. 477 (1994) (considering MD&A disclosure requirements and various 
issues that have arisen in the requirements’ application); Eric R. Harper, 
Unveiling Management’s Crystal Ball, 77 LA. L. REV. 879 (2017) (discussing the 
history and various applications of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, and Item 303); 
Lauren M. Mastronardi, Note, Shining the Light a Little Brighter: Should Item 
303 Serve as a Basis for Liability Under Rule 10b-5?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 
(2016) (discussing the split between the Second and Ninth Circuits concerning 
the disclosure requirement of Item 303 and liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5); Brian Neach, Note, Item 303’s Role in Private Causes of Action Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 741 (2001) (noting the 
uncertainty concerning the application of Item 303 violations in private causes of 
actions and presenting a standard of review for such allegations in securities 
cases); Suzanne J. Romajas, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: 
A Look at the Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S245 (1993) (discussing the 
differing approaches that the SEC and courts have taken concerning the 
disclosure of forward-looking information). 
 7. See generally Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., No. 16-581, 2017 WL 
4622142 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2017) (stating that the proceedings are held “in abeyance”). 
If the settlement is not approved by the Southern District of New York, Leidos 
will be back on the Supreme Court’s docket for the October 2018 term. 
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Leidos arose before the Court due to an intensifying clash 
between the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit—the two federal 
appellate courts that together handle more securities cases than 
all other circuits combined.8 The conflict first materialized in a 
2015 decision, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley9 
(Stratte-McClure), in which the Second Circuit declared that its 
interpretation of the relationship between Item 303 and Section 
10(b) was “at odds” with a Ninth Circuit case from the prior year, 
In re NVIDIA Corporate Securities Litigation10 (NVIDIA).11 When 
the Second Circuit decided Leidos a year later, it closely followed 
the reasoning set forth in Stratte-McClure.12 Leidos is therefore 
perceived as escalating a preexisting dispute among the federal 
appellate courts,13 and, as the Leidos plaintiff’s successful petition 
for certiorari (Cert. Petition) states, introduced “a deep split of 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 1–2 (noting that “[t]he Second and 
Ninth Circuits, which see more federal securities cases than the rest of the 
circuits combined, are in open disagreement” concerning this issue); see also Brief 
for the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Petitioner, 
Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Pub. Ret. Sys. at 16–17, No. 16-581 (U.S. June 28, 2017), 
2017 WL 2859944 (discussing approaches taken by other circuits); Filings 
Database, STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://securities.stanford.edu/circuits.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) (listing 
securities class action filings in every circuit) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 9. 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 10. 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 11. See id. at 103 (noting that the Ninth Circuit held that “Item 303’s 
disclosure duty is not actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5” (citing 
NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1046)). 
 12. See Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85, 94 n.7 (2d Cir. 2016) (discussing 
Stratte-McClure and its applications to the Leidos case). 
 13. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 9 (“The clashing approaches among 
the federal courts of appeals powerfully demonstrate the need for a uniform rule 
on whether plaintiffs may assert Section 10(b) claims based on omissions that are 
not necessary to make affirmative statements not misleading.”); Creating A Clear 
Circuit Split, the Second Circuit Holds That Failure to Disclose Known Trends or 
Uncertainties Under Item 303 of Regulation S-K Creates Liability Under Section 
10(b), GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 22, 2015) [hereinafter GIBSON, DUNN 
& CRUTCHER LLP], https://www.gibsondunn.com/creating-a-clear-circuit-split-
the-second-circuit-holds-that-failure-to-disclose-known-trends-or-
uncertainties-under-item-303-of-regulation-s-k-creates-liability-under-section-
10b/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) (discussing the circuit split resulting from the 
Stratte-McClure and NVIDIA decisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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authority with respect to one of the most important—and 
frequently invoked—provisions of the federal securities laws.”14  
Or so the conventional wisdom holds. In contrast, this Article 
argues that although Leidos did raise fundamental questions of 
securities law, they were not the questions that everyone supposes 
them to be, nor the ones that the Court likely would have 
addressed. The primary reason is that the circuit split that the 
Court is presumably seeking to resolve does not in fact exist. On 
the core legal question at issue in Leidos, the Second Circuit and 
Ninth Circuit are in full agreement. The relevant cases from both 
circuits draw on an earlier Third Circuit opinion written by 
then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito, Oran v. Stafford15 (Oran), and 
come to the exact same conclusion: a failure to comply with Item 
303 may constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5 under some 
circumstances, but does not necessarily do so.16 Only two 
alternatives to this outcome are logically possible: 
(1) noncompliance with Item 303 could always constitute a per se 
violation of Rule 10b-5, or (2) Item 303 could provide a safe harbor 
that can never serve as a basis for fraud claims. Neither of those 
positions have been adopted by any federal court to have 
considered the issue. As a predictive matter, then, the Court likely 
would have summarily affirmed the lower court decision in Leidos, 
and on the same grounds that were articulated by the Second 
Circuit.17 
While this may not be the first time that the Court has 
stumbled into agreement with overstated rhetoric in a petition for 
certiorari, what is remarkable about Leidos is that the Cert. 
Petition’s narrative of intractable conflict among the circuit courts 
has been universally embraced by surrounding commentary on the 
case.18 One example is the defendants’ Brief in Opposition to the 
                                                                                                     
 14. Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 1. 
 15. 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 16. See id. at 288 (holding that “a violation of SK-303’s reporting 
requirements does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 
10b-5”); see also Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (noting that “Oran actually 
suggested, without deciding, that in certain instances a violation of Item 303 
could give rise to a material 10b-5 omission”); NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1054–55 
(agreeing with Oran’s reasoning regarding Item 303’s disclosure requirement).  
 17. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the potential impacts of the Leidos 
settlement). 
 18. See Matthew Ady, Living in a Material World: Does a Violation of Item 
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Cert. Petition, which concedes that there is a circuit split on the 
question presented in Leidos but attempts to downplay its 
significance.19 Other amicus briefs that were filed with the Court 
are even more emphatic about the presence of a split and stress 
the need for it to be resolved as soon as possible.20 Law firms that 
specialize in securities litigation have released a number of 
publications aimed at updating their defense-side clients about 
Leidos, and such “client alerts” are also in accord with this 
consensus interpretation.21 The same can be said for scholarly 
analyses: the Cert. Petition’s theory of the case has been embraced 
by a leading securities law casebook,22 every law journal article on 
                                                                                                     
303 of Regulation S-K Satisfy the Materiality Element in a Rule 10b-5 Cause of 
Action?, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 439 (2017) (“Despite its 
30-year pedigree, Item 303 still generates considerable confusion among courts 
regarding its relationship with Rule 10b-5.”); Brian Currie, Note, Much Ado About 
Nothing: The Limits of Liability for Item 303 Omissions and the Circuit Split That 
Never Was, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 379, 383 (2017) (“Despite all of the 
commotion, the Supreme Court chose not to address the issue when given the 
opportunity.”); Harper, supra note 6, at 880 (noting the pressing need for Supreme 
Court review on this issue in order to resolve confusion among the lower courts). 
 19.  See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Leidos, 
Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., No. 16-581 (U.S. Feb. 8, 2017), 2017 WL 8292356 
[hereinafter Brief in Oppo to Pet. for Cert.] (admitting that there is a “nascent 
circuit split” while arguing that the question should be allowed to “percolate” in 
the lower courts because the specific procedural posture of Leidos makes it unripe 
for the Court to review); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, 7, Leidos, No. 16-581 
(pointing out that the opposition “concedes” and “acknowledges” that there is a 
circuit split). 
 20. See Brief for the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 8, at 2–3, 15 (“The split that the Second Circuit 
has created should be resolved as speedily as possible.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. in Support of Petitioners at 2, Leidos, No. 16-581 (“The ruling 
of the Second Circuit below confirmed a conflict between the Second and the Third 
and Ninth Circuits on the relationship [between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5].”); 
Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 5–7 (discussing the split of authorities 
in detail). 
 21. See, e.g., U.S. SUPREME COURT GRANTS CERTIORARI TO DECIDE ISSUE THAT 
MIGHT HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON REGISTRANTS’ EXPOSURE FOR 
NON-DISCLOSURE OF “KNOWN TRENDS OR UNCERTAINTIES” IN SEC FILINGS 3–4 
(2017), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication _Securities_ 
Litigation_3_27_17.pdf (discussing the implications of the Court’s upcoming 
decision for clients); GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 13 (discussing 
the “clear circuit split” created by Stratte-McClure and NVIDIA). 
 22. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 611 (8th ed. 2017) (describing an 
alleged split between the Third Circuit in Oran and the Second Circuit in 
964 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957 (2018) 
point,23 and several academic legal blogs that cover current 
developments in corporate law and securities regulation.24 
This Article argues that the startling uniformity of (mistaken) 
interpretations in Leidos reflects more than an unhappy 
coincidence. Rather, it is symptomatic of fundamental 
misconceptions about how the securities regulation architecture 
works. Accordingly, the Article seeks not only to examine the legal 
questions directly at issue in Leidos, but also explore how and why 
it has come to be enveloped in such widespread misunderstanding. 
In doing so, the Article identifies two underlying sources of 
confusion and draws out the broader implications that those 
disputes carry for understanding securities regulation. One cause 
of the Leidos mix-up stems from a parallel line of case law, which 
addresses the intersection of MD&A disclosures with investor suits 
premised on Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities Act (the 33 
                                                                                                     
Stratte-McClure). 
 23. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 6, at 880, 900–08 (arguing that the Court 
must resolve the conflict among circuits relating to Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 fraud 
claims); Mastronardi, supra note 6, at 337, 350–60 (“A recent split between the 
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit provides a vivid example of the implications 
of a court’s decision in the securities realm.”); Voigt, Crawford & Galaro, supra 
note 6 (“[R]ecent disagreement between the Ninth and Second Circuits makes the 
discussion [of how Item 303 relates to Rule 10b-5] newly ripe.”). 
 24. See, e.g., David M. J. Rein & Hao Tschang, Supreme Court Certiorari on 
Non-Disclosure of “Known Trends or Uncertainties” in SEC Filings, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 8, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/08/supreme-court-certiorari-on-non-
disclosure-of-known-trends-or-uncertainties-in-sec-filings/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2018) (“The U.S. Supreme Court will address a split between the Second 
Circuit . . . and the Third and Ninth Circuits . . . [and its decision] may have a 
significant impact on [public companies’] potential exposure to securities fraud 
claims.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Audra Soloway et 
al., Paul Weiss Discusses Securities Fraud Liability Based Solely on Omissions, 
COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG ON CORPS. & CAP. MKTS. (April 6, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/06/paul-weiss-discusses-securities-
fraud-liability-based-solely-on-omissions/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)  
On March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a 
potentially significant securities case . . . [and] will resolve a split 
between the Second and Ninth circuits caused by the Second Circuit’s 
holding that issuers may be liable for federal securities fraud by 
omitting information required to be disclosed by SEC regulations. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Securities Act).25 These cases have been caught in the crossfire 
among the Second and Ninth Circuits precedents in Leidos, and 
are at times cited as a basis of disagreement between the courts.26  
Although the relationship between Item 30327 and claims 
under the 33 Securities Act have received minimal scholarly 
attention, this Article takes a closer look at that question and finds 
that several surprising conclusions follow.28 First, while the 
caselaw appears to involve a dispute over whether holdings from 
33 Securities Act decisions on Item 303 may be imported into fraud 
actions under Rule 10b-5, none of the relevant opinions actually 
take such a step.29 Instead, the consistent pattern is for courts to 
draw a strict divide between the 33 Securities Act provisions and 
Section 10(b).30 Second, none of the rationales that the caselaw 
uses to distinguish the statutory authorities in this area can be 
justified.31 As outlined below, the same analysis of Section 10(b) 
that should have driven the outcome in Leidos must necessarily 
apply with equal force to Sections 11 and 12.32 The ironic result is 
                                                                                                     
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012) (codifying who may bring an action for 
claims of false registration statements and who is liable); id. § 77l(a)(2) (setting 
forth who is liable for claims related to prospectuses and communications). 
 26. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(arguing that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted the relationship between 
Rule 10b-5 and Section 12(a)(2) (citing Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 
706 (2d Cir. 2011))); see also Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Comm’ns, Inc., 681 
F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that in the Item 303 context, the surrounding 
uncertainty concerning the flow of information is key to disclosure obligations). 
See generally Steckman v. Hart Brewing Inc., 143 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 27. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2017) (“Management’s discussion and analysis 
of financial condition and results of operations.”). 
 28. Infra Part IV. 
 29. Infra Part IV.B. 
 30. Infra Part IV.B. Roughly speaking, the 33 Securities Act decisions stand 
for the proposition that Item 303 violations automatically give rise to actionable 
claims under Section 11 or Section 12 as a matter of law in every case.  
 31. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104 (“But Section 12(a)(2)’s prohibition 
on omissions is textually identical to that of Rule 10b–5: both make unlawful 
omission of ‘material fact[s] . . . necessary in order to make . . . statements, in 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.’” (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 77l (2012))). 
 32. Infra Part IV.C. The reason is that the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit 
decisions all turn on the materiality element in Section 10(b) claims, and the 
materiality standard for the 33 Securities Act and the 34 Exchange Act are 
identical.  
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that the Court had taken up the wrong case: the legal question 
presented by Section 10(b) in Leidos did not cry out for review and 
likely would have been affirmed as a matter of course; at the same 
time, however, any Leidos decision would have indirectly rendered 
a wide swath of Section 11 and Section 12 cases incorrect.33 Third, 
it will be argued that this outcome, while unlikely at first glance, 
is representative of some wider pathologies in judicial 
decision-making and the legal scholarship in securities law.34 
The other source of the Leidos mixup involves a controversy 
over a foundational doctrine in securities law known as the “duty 
to disclose.”35 The origins of this debate can be found in an 
influential scholarly critique of the way that federal courts have 
handled the duty to disclose in securities fraud cases relating to 
MD&A,36 including then-Circuit Judge Alito’s opinion for the Third 
Circuit in Oran.37 Through an interesting twist, the theoretical 
                                                                                                     
 33. Infra Part IV.D. 
 34. Infra Part IV.D. Namely, there is tendency to shortcut the analysis by 
adopting an overly narrow perspective on the relevant statutory authorities. That 
strategy often yields incoherent results, however, because it fails to take account 
of the integrated architecture of securities regulation. See Stephen M. Bainbridge 
& G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else 
Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 
83, 118 (2002) (“The key point with the shortcuts is that they serve to avoid 
complexity.”). 
 35. The starting point of the confusion is dicta from an insider trading case, 
Chiarella v. United States, which has come to be cited as hornbook law for the 
proposition that silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 
10b-5. See 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) 
[A]dministrative and judicial interpretations have established that 
silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may 
operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) despite the absence of 
statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the 
legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is premised upon a duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
parties to a transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to 
trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to 
place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not benefit 
personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information. 
 36. See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to 
Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1650–51 (2004) (citing Oran as 
a leading example of how courts’ analysis of securities fraud claims go astray 
when they conflate the duty question with the materiality element of Rule 10b-5 
actions). 
 37. See generally Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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framework proposed in the academic literature38 makes its way 
into the key precedents in Leidos, where it is directly referenced in 
Judge Livingston’s Stratte-McClure opinion as the basis for finding 
the Second Circuit “at odds” with Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
Item 303.39 
As this Article will demonstrate, however, the courts’ putative 
disagreement over the duty to disclose falls away once two 
pervasive misconceptions regarding the doctrine are dispelled.40 
First, contrary to the controlling view, the duty to disclose does not 
establish a set of conditions that may “trigger” a connection 
between alleged nondisclosures of MD&A information under Item 
303 and fraud actions under Rule 10b-5.41 Properly understood, the 
legal relationship between the two regulations is much more 
limited, and does not extend beyond the fact that they contain 
similarly worded provisions. Second, and more fundamentally, the 
duty issue is of limited relevance in Leidos because it does not play 
a meaningful role in the disposition of any securities law case 
(outside of the insider trading context).42 For claims brought in 
connection with disclosure requirements, the duty question is 
entirely circular—it represents a legal conclusion rather than an 
intermediate step in the analysis. The takeaway for securities 
regulation is that theoretical debates over the meaning of the duty 
doctrine function primarily to obscure rather than clarify, and are 
best left behind by legal scholars and federal courts when dealing 
with disclosure cases.  
In summary, this Article makes three contributions. First, it 
identifies overlooked aspects of a significant securities law case 
pending before the Court, and provides a novel analysis of how the 
case should have been decided. Second, this Article extends that 
                                                                                                     
 38. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1643–44 (“Conceptually 
though, in order to provide a meaningful discussion about the duty question, we 
have to separate it carefully from the materiality question.”). 
 39. Id.; see also Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 
2015) (citing Langevoort and Gulati’s article). The primary argument which the 
Second Circuit borrows from the scholarship in this area is that courts will fail to 
analyze securities fraud cases correctly unless they carefully separate the 
question of a legal duty to disclose from other elements of the claim, such as the 
requirement that misstatements or omissions must be material.  
 40. Infra Part V.A.  
 41. Infra Part V.B. 
 42. Infra Part V.B.2. 
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analysis by showing that the same misunderstandings which have 
accompanied the disclosure rules and securities fraud claims in the 
Rule 10b-5 fraud context also carry over to other areas of the 
securities law framework, namely Sections 11 and 12 of the 33 
Securities Act. Third, it uses Leidos as a case study to demonstrate 
that a central securities law doctrine, the duty to disclose, serves 
little practical purpose and should play a reduced role in securities 
regulation. Taken together, these points suggest that Leidos was a 
much more unusual case than has been appreciated, and stands at 
striking confluence of legal and scholarly confusions, many of 
which concern fundamental principles of securities regulation. 
The discussion below proceeds as follows. Part II provides 
regulatory and statutory background.43 Part III introduces the 
Leidos case history and lower court opinions, explains why the 
circuit split at issue is illusory, and explains how that should have 
driven the Court’s disposition of the case if it were not precluded 
by settlement between the parties on the eve of oral argument.44 
Part IV identifies the implications that Leidos carries for claims 
under Sections 11 and 12 of the 33 Securities Act.45 Part V provides 
a revisionist interpretation of the meaning of the duty to disclose 
doctrine in Leidos, and in the securities law more generally.46 Part 
VI briefly concludes.47 
II. The Statutory & Regulatory Framework in Securities Law 
A. The 1933 Securities Act & 1934 Exchange Act 
Securities law pursues the twin goals of protecting investors 
and facilitating capital formation.48 The main tool used to reach 
                                                                                                     
 43. Infra Part II. 
 44. Infra Part III. 
 45. Infra Part IV. 
 46. Infra Part V. 
 47. Infra Part VI. 
 48. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 19–22 
(6th ed. 2006); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: 
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
903, 941–45 (1998) (“One of the most cited and intuitive goals of the securities 
laws is the protection of investors.”).  
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those ends is the mandatory disclosure regime.49 The Securities 
Act of 193350 (33 Securities Act) and Securities Exchange Act of 
193451 (34 Exchange Act), along with the attendant rules and 
regulations issued by the SEC, establish an elaborate regulatory 
framework based on this premise.52  
The 33 Securities Act takes a transaction-based approach that 
requires companies to make initial disclosures when issuing 
securities to the public.53 The 33 Securities Act consists of 
registration provisions and liability provisions.54 In the liability 
                                                                                                     
 49. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 
(1963) (stating that the purpose common to the securities laws was to “substitute 
a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”); Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (explaining that the fundamental 
purpose of securities laws is replacing caveat emptor with full disclosure); Jordan 
v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The ‘duty’ in question 
is the fiduciary duty of corporate law. Close corporations buying their own stock, 
like knowledgeable insiders of closely held firms buying from outsiders, have a 
fiduciary duty to disclose material facts.”). The standard rationale for such a 
framework is that disclosure rules can achieve the benefits of efficient capital 
markets by reducing the information asymmetry between firms and investors, 
while avoiding the costs associated with more heavy-handed forms of 
intervention. See Williams, supra note 5, at 1199–200 (“The capital markets in 
the United States are celebrated for their financial transparency. This financial 
transparency derives primarily from the specific information about operating 
results, presented using rigorous accounting principles, that federal securities 
laws require public companies to report on a quarterly and annual basis.”); Robert 
B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 885–86 (2003) (explaining 
that increased federal securities regulation “increases the role of shareholders by 
permitting them (rather than the directors) to hold officers accountable”).  
 50. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77bbbb (2012)). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78qq (2012)). 
 52. Congressman Sam Rayburn, who spearheaded the drafting of the 33 
Securities and 34 Exchange Acts, relied heavily on Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner 
C. Means’ book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which argued that 
corporate management should be held more accountable to shareholders through 
additional disclosure requirements. 77 CONG. REC. 2917 (1933) (statement of Rep. 
Rayburn). Of course, Rayburn and his contemporaries were also influenced by the 
writings of Louis Brandeis, who is responsible for the oft-quoted statement 
justifying the disclosure regime: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S 
MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).  
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012).  
 54. Id. 
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provisions, Section 11 applies to registration statements,55 while 
Section 12 applies to a distinct but related offering document, 
known as a prospectus.56 Section 11 of the 33 Securities Act 
establishes liability for an untrue statement of material fact, or 
omission of a material fact, made in the registration statement.57 
Likewise, Section 12(a)(2) prohibits untrue statements of material 
fact, or omissions thereof, in any communication made in 
connection with a general distribution of securities through 
interstate commerce.58 Sections 11 and 12 of the 33 Securities Act 
are prominent examples of the securities laws’ joint private-public 
enforcement structure; these provisions create opportunities for 
both private suits by investors, as well as enforcement by the 
SEC.59 
The 34 Exchange Act, on the other hand, reflects a periodic 
approach to disclosure, and contains requirements that are in 
effect after the securities offering has taken place.60 This means 
Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K must be filed with the SEC by all 
companies with publicly traded securities.61 The key liability 
provision in the 34 Exchange Act is the anti-fraud prohibition 
found in Section 10(b), and its counterpart, Rule 10b-5.62 Rule 
                                                                                                     
 55. Id. § 77k. 
 56. Id. § 77l(a)(2). 
 57. Id. § 77k(a).  
 58. Id. § 77l(a)(2). 
 59. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (explaining that a cause of action for private suits exists under Section 11); 
see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642 (1988) (determining that a cause of 
action for private suits exists under Section 12). 
 60. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2012). 
 61. The 34 Exchange Act also created the SEC and empowered it with broad 
regulatory authority over the securities industry. In addition to periodic 
disclosures such at 10-Ks and 10-Qs, the 34 Exchange Act also requires disclosure 
of board elections at annual shareholder meetings, as well as information related 
to any major corporate event such as a merger or sale. See generally 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78nn. 
 62. See id. § 78j(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, . . . [t]o use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-
based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device . . . .”); see also 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, to employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”). The SEC finalized Rule 10b-5 in 1942. 
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10b-5, in pertinent part, states that it shall be unlawful “to make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading.”63  
Liability under Section 10(b) differs from that under the 33 
Securities Act’s Sections 11 and 12 in a number of ways. The most 
important distinction is that, to bring a successful 10b-5 claim, a 
plaintiff must establish that he relied upon the misleading or 
omitted material information, and that the defendant acted with 
scienter.64 In contrast, for both Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) 
claims, the plaintiff is not required to plead scienter.65 Further, 
unlike Sections 11 and 12, the language of Section 10(b) does not 
authorize lawsuits by investors, yet an implied private right of 
action has uniformly been read into the statute by courts.66 In fact, 
Rule 10b-5 has been called the “biggest stick” in the securities 
laws—in part because it can be enforced not only by the SEC and 
private litigants, but also by the Department of Justice, which can 
                                                                                                     
 63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Courts have distilled this rule into six elements: 
(1) material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) connection between 
the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; 
(4) reliance upon the misstatement or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
157 (2008). 
 64. See generally Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 551 U.S. 308 (2007) 
(holding that the inference of scienter must be as cogent as any opposing inference 
of non-fraudulent intent, regardless of whether the claim is brought by a private 
plaintiff or the government). The scienter requirement is also accompanied by a 
higher pleading standard, provided by Rule 9(b) of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) and the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA). See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must 
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, 
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged 
generally.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (“[T]he complaint shall specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission 
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all 
facts on which that belief is formed.”). 
 65. See PAUL VIZCARRONDO, JR., LIABILITIES UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAWS 28 (2014), www.wlrk.com/docs/OutlineofSecuritiesLawLiabilities2014.pdf 
(outlining the elements for liability under the relevant sections of the 33 
Securities Act and the 34 Exchange Act). 
 66. See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs Stores, 421 U.S. 723 
(1975). 
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impose criminal penalties for violations of the statute.67 The 
similarities and distinctions between the 33 Securities Act 
Sections 11 and 12 claims and that of the 34 Exchange Act Section 
10(b) prove critical in the analysis of Leidos and other cases, as 
discussed below.  
B. Reg. S-K: Item 303 MD&A Rules 
For decades, critics pointed out that the disclosure 
requirements under the 33 Securities Act and the 34 Exchange Act 
produced “pointless duplication.”68 As a result, the SEC eventually 
adopted integrated disclosure regulations in 1980, set forth in 
Regulation S-K (Reg. S-K).69 Critical to the analysis provided 
herein are the disclosure requirements relating to MD&A found in 
Reg. S-K.  
The historical roots of the MD&A reach back to SEC 
guidelines issued in 1968, which dictated that companies must 
include in their registration statements a discussion of “unusual 
conditions that affected the appropriateness of the earnings 
                                                                                                     
 67. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (including deceit through means of interstate 
commerce); see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737 (stating that Rule 10b-5 
is “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”). 
 68. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The 
Coming Debate over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1145 
(1995) (“Logically, a corporate issuer seeking to sell securities under a continuous 
disclosure system [of the 34 Exchange Act] would only be required to disclose any 
additional material information that it had not previously disclosed pursuant to 
the continuous disclosure system.”). See generally Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in 
Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966) (arguing that the 33 Securities 
Act and the 34 Exchange Act disclosure requirements should have been 
integrated into a single statute); STAFF OF THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT 
ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K 8 (2013) 
(summarizing the background of disclosure rules and the purpose of Regulation 
S-K as streamlining disclosures).  
 69. Reg. S-K demands a formidable amount of disclosure regarding corporate 
operations, governance structures, financial information, pending legal 
proceedings, corporate officers and board members, among numerous other 
topics. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–1208 (2017); Amendments to Annual Report Form, 
Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and Guides, SEC Release No. 33-6231, 45 
Fed. Reg. 63630 (Sept. 25, 1980); Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11380 (Mar. 3, 1982). Also 
adopted pursuant to the Integrated Disclosure System was Regulation S-X, which 
sets forth requirements for accounting statements. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01–
210-12.29.  
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presentation and footnotes indicating adverse changes in 
operating results subsequent to the latest period in the earnings 
summary.”70 Since that time, the SEC has continued to amend the 
disclosure requirements pertaining to the MD&A, with an eye 
toward providing investors with “a narrative explanation for the 
financial statements, because a numerical presentation . . . may be 
insufficient for an investor to judge the quality of earnings and the 
likelihood that past performance is indicative of future 
performance.”71 The MD&A section, by definition, includes “soft 
information,” which relates to qualitative assessments of operating 
performance, in addition to “hard information” contained in 
quantitative overviews of companies’ financial conditions.72 
In its current form, Reg. S-K rules for MD&A require 
discussion of liquidity, capital resources, and results of 
operations.73 Item 303 requires the identification and description 
of any “known trends or uncertainties” that will affect any one of 
the three areas (liquidity, capital resources, or operations).74 As 
part of Reg. S-K, the MD&A requirements set out in Item 303 
apply to both offering documents subject to the 33 Securities Act 
rules, and periodic post-offering disclosures that are covered by the 
34 Exchange Act.75 Unlike the liability structure for Sections 11 
and 12, however, there is no statutory provision that explicitly 
provides a private right of action for non-compliance with the 
MD&A disclosure rules set out in Item 303.76 Further, unlike 
causes of action stemming from Section 10(b), courts have 
refrained from reading an implicit private right of action into Reg. 
                                                                                                     
 70. Guides for Preparation and Filing of Statements, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-4936, 33 Fed. Reg. 18617-02 (Dec. 9, 1968).  
 71. Concept Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33-6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 
13715-02 (Apr. 17, 1987).  
 72. 17 C.F.R. § 229. 
 73. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities 
Release No. 33-6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427-01 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 SEC 
Release].  
 74. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
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S-K violations.77 The SEC retains enforcement authority, however, 
over violations of the disclosure requirements found in Reg. S-K.78 
C. The Materiality Requirement 
An important commonality across all four statutory 
authorities—Section 10(b), Section 11, Section 12, and Item 303—
is the materiality requirement.79 The disclosure requirements 
mandated by these provisions apply to information that is 
material. Materiality was first defined in 1976, when the Court 
held in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.80 that a material fact, and 
therefore one that must be disclosed, is a statement that “would 
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”81 As the Court has explained in TSC Industries and 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2000) (drawing this 
distinction and citing a string of cases that hold the same). 
 78. See Harper, supra note 6, at 894–900 (discussing the history of the SEC’s 
enforcement authority over Reg. S-K disclosure requirements). For offering 
documents subject to Sections 11 and 12, the SEC reviews disclosures before they 
become effective. Likewise, for periodic disclosures subject to 10(b), such as 
10-K’s, the SEC also can take administrative actions by issuing cease-and-desist 
orders that seek injunctive relief. See generally C. A. Cassell, L. M. Dreher & L. 
A. Myers, Reviewing the SEC’s Review Process: 10-K Comment Letters and the 
Cost of Remediation, 88 ACCT. REV. 1875 (2013) (assessing the effectiveness of the 
SEC’s feedback on disclosures prior to an SEC administrative action). 
 79. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) 
(articulating the materiality standard). The SEC codified this standard in its Rule 
405. “The term material, when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing 
of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters 
to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach 
importance in determining whether to purchase the security registered.” 17 
C.F.R. § 230.405 (2017). Rules 408 and 12b-20 also require any “such further 
material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required 
statements, in the light of the circumstances in which they are made, not 
misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (covering 33 Securities Act disclosures); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (applying to 34 Exchange Act disclosures). 
 80. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 81. See id. at 448–49  
Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its 
disclosure may accomplish more harm than good. The potential 
liability for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if the 
standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the 
corporation and its management be subjected to liability for 
THE LEIDOS MIXUP 975 
elsewhere, the purpose of materiality is to introduce a 
counterweight against the otherwise daunting disclosure 
requirements contained in both Acts.82 
The TSC Industries standard provides relatively clear 
guidance when considering the materiality of hard facts, such as 
past financial information, but the parameters for materiality 
become less precise when considering speculative, forward-looking 
or “soft” information.83 In 1988, the Court attempted to clarify that 
the test for estimating when speculative or forward-looking 
information rose to the level of “material” is the “probability versus 
magnitude test.”84 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,85 the Court rejected a 
bright-line test for materiality and held that, in the context of 
merger negotiations, materiality will depend on the likelihood of 
the future transaction taking place, and the significance of the 
transaction to the issuer.86 In doing so, the Court explained it was 
                                                                                                     
insignificant omissions or misstatements, but also management’s fear 
of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury 
the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information[,] a result that 
is hardly conducive to informed decision-making.  
Cf. Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of “Material” in 
Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167 (2011) (suggesting that the formulation 
for materiality is inherently abstract and often overbroad). 
82. See TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 448 (“That purpose is not merely to 
ensure by judicial means that the transaction, when judged by its real terms, is 
fair and otherwise adequate, but to ensure disclosures by corporate management 
in order to enable the shareholders to make an informed choice.”). 
 83. “Forward-looking information” is defined as a statement related to or 
describing events or activities that will occur, if at all, at some future date. JAMES 
D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 602–05 (5th ed. 
2006); 15 U.S.C § 78u-5 (2012). 
 84. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (“[M]ateriality ‘will 
depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that 
the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the 
totality of the company activity.’” (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F.2d. 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968))); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: 
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 152 (“Basic stands for 
the proposition that materiality is about what is important to investors, nothing 
more and nothing less, and offers a way (the so-called probability-magnitude test) 
for estimating when speculative information is sufficiently important or not.”). 
 85. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 86. See id. at 250 (“Materiality in the merger context depends on the 
probability that the transaction will be consummated, and its significance to the 
issuer of the securities. Materiality depends on the facts and thus is to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.”). 
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creating a substantively distinct test that applied to 
forward-looking statements and estimates.87 
The materiality standard for claims brought under either the 
33 Securities Act’s Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) or the 34 Exchange 
Act’s Section 10b are the same.88 Materiality, for purposes of 
claims under either Act, is tied to the definitions set forth in TSC 
Industries and Basic.89 Importantly, the SEC’s regulations adopt, 
without alteration, the baseline TSC Industries standard for 
materiality for “hard” information.90 However, the SEC muddied 
the waters in 1989 by creating a different standard for materiality 
that applies to the forward-looking information required by 
Item 303.91 The SEC’s test for Item 303 disclosure is as follows: 
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or 
uncertainty likely to come to fruition? If management 
determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no 
disclosure is required; (2) If management cannot make that 
determination, it must evaluate objectively the consequences of 
the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, 
on the assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure is 
then required unless management determines that a material 
                                                                                                     
 87. See id. at 239 (“Generally, in order to assess the probability that the 
event will occur, a factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest in the 
transaction at the highest corporate levels.”).  
 88. See Aaron J. Benjamin, Stuck with Steckman: Why Item 303 Cannot Be 
a Surrogate for Section 11, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 61 n.97 (2017) (citing 
In re Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994)); Sherman v. Network 
Commerce, Inc., 346 F. Appx. 211, 213 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To establish materiality, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate a ‘substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would have acted differently if the misrepresentation had not been made or the 
truth had been disclosed.’” (citing Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, 
Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005))); In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. 
Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 360 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The definition of materiality is the same 
for these provisions as it is under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.”).  
 89. See TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining 
materiality as information that “would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available”); Basic, 485 U.S. at 250 (“Materiality in the merger context depends on 
the probability that the transaction will be consummated, and its significance to 
the issuer of the securities. Materiality depends on the facts and thus is to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 90. See generally 1989 SEC Release, supra note 73. 
 91. Id. 
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effect on the registrant’s financial condition or results of 
operations is not reasonably likely to occur.92 
Thus, the plain language of the Item 303 test departs 
noticeably from the standard articulated in Basic, particularly in 
the second step of the test, which calls for the disclosure of known 
trends even where the probability that they will be important in 
the future cannot be estimated.93 Most commentators who have 
compared the standards conclude that the procedure required 
under Item 303 is substantially different from the standard 
governing Section 10(b).94 Moreover, the SEC explicitly makes this 
point in its 1989 Release, which declares the Basic standard 
“inapposite” to Item 303.95 As explained below, the subtle but 
widely acknowledged differences in the materiality standards 
prove consequential for the legal analysis in Leidos and related 
cases that examine the relationship between Reg. S-K’s MD&A 
rules and Section 10(b).96  
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
 94. See, e.g., Neach, supra note 6 (“Item 303 materiality standards can be 
both broader and narrower than the Basic test, depending on the 
circumstances.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 993–94 (1996) [hereinafter Coffee, Jr., 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act] (“The MD&A’s standard of materiality 
is different from the probability/magnitude tradeoff that the Supreme Court 
endorsed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More 
Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 
753, 764 (1997) (calling the Item 303 materiality standard “murky at best”); id. 
at 775 (“the Commission’s MD&A requirement expressly rejects materiality as 
the threshold for disclosure of ‘known trends or uncertainties.’ What comes in its 
place is a higher standard, though not much more determinate: disclosure is 
required only of trends and uncertainties that are ‘reasonably likely to occur.”). 
But see Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear A Good Thing Is Coming to 
An End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 726 (1999) 
(arguing that the two standards are only superficially different, and that Item 
303 may in some cases provide a stricter criterion than the standard articulated 
in Basic).  
 95. 1989 SEC Release, supra note 73, at n.27. 
 96. Infra Part IV–V.  
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III. Leidos: The Illusory Circuit Split 
This Part first lays out the factual background and procedural 
history of the case as it developed in the Southern District of New 
York (SDNY) and the Second Circuit.97 Next, it argues that, 
contrary to the existing commentary on the case, Leidos does not 
present an actual circuit split; instead, it reflects a consistent 
approach among the circuits regarding Item 303 and Section 10(b) 
actions.98 The discussion then closes with some tentative 
predictions about how the case will be decided by the Court.99 The 
subsequent Part IV and V will draw on the analysis of Leidos 
presented directly below, and show how it casts light on broader 
doctrinal and theoretical questions in securities regulation.100 
A. Leidos in the Lower Courts 
1. Factual Background & Proceedings in SDNY 
Leidos began as a federal securities class action filed in the 
SDNY on February 22, 2012, against a technology firm doing 
business at the time as SAIC, Inc., and now known as Leidos, 
Inc.101 The class action was initiated by the Indiana Public 
Retirement System as lead plaintiff, on behalf of itself and other 
similarly situated investors in Leidos, Inc.102 
The class plaintiff’s allegations in Leidos arose from a contract 
entered into by Leidos, Inc. and the City of New York (NYC) in 
2001.103 Pursuant to that contract, Leidos, Inc. committed to 
develop and implement an automated workplace management 
system, called CityTime, which was to be used by NYC’s 
                                                                                                     
 97. Infra Part III.A.1. 
 98. Infra Part III.A.2. 
 99. Infra Part III.A.3. 
 100. Infra Part IV & V. 
 101. See generally In re SAIC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 12-CV-1353, 2013 WL 
5462289 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) [hereinafter In re SAIC, Inc. Mem. & Order]. 
For purposes of this Article, we refer to the company simply as Leidos, Inc. 
throughout.  
 102. Id. at *1. 
 103. Id.  
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administrative agencies.104 The initial budget for CityTime was 
$63 million, but its significance to Leidos, Inc. exceeded that 
headline dollar figure—the rollout of CityTime in New York was 
considered to be a proving ground that would demonstrate the 
program’s success, and thereby lead to similar deals with 
municipalities across the country.105 The project, however, did not 
go as planned. By late 2010, Leidos, Inc. had billed NYC $628 
million for its work on CityTime, rather than the quoted $63 
million.106 Moreover, the Bloomberg administration was actively 
exploring ways to sever the business relationship.107  
Spiraling costs associated with CityTime turned out to reflect 
more than mere logistical problems, and were in large part the 
byproduct of an elaborate kickback scheme orchestrated by certain 
Leidos, Inc. employees, including senior managers Gerard Denault 
and Carl Bell.108 The details of that scheme were gradually exposed 
over the course of late 2010 and early 2011, as a result of (parallel 
but uncoordinated) investigatory efforts on the part of federal 
prosecutors, the NYC administration run out of Mayor 
Bloomberg’s office, and a private law firm investigation conducted 
internally by Leidos, Inc. itself.109 The details of the CityTime 
                                                                                                     
 104. Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 4.  
 105. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 106. Id.  
 107. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 4 (“As of October 2011, CityTime 
supported more than 163,000 City employees and nearly 70 City departments. It 
has been hailed by City officials, including former Mayor Bloomberg, as ‘a great 
success.’”); see also Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal 
Securities Laws ¶ 115, In re SAIC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:12-cv-01353-DAB 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013), 2013 WL 5462289 [hereinafter Am. Compl.]. 
 108. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 89. Denault and Bell were paid for each hour a 
subcontractor or consultant worked on CityTime, and decided to hire more 
workers than CityTime needed in order to inflate Leidos, Inc.’s billable hours and 
hourly rates.  
 109. Id. at 90. The key dates are as follows. NYC and federal officials became 
aware of the overpayments and, in December 2010, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 
the Southern District of New York filed a criminal complaint regarding the 
fraudulent overbilling on the CityTime project. Id. at 91. In February 2011, the 
U.S. Attorney’s office issued a press release announcing the indictment of 
CityTime consultants, one of whom had already plead guilty to fraud allegations. 
Id. at 89. On June 20, 2011, the U.S. Attorney’s office issued a subsequent press 
release adding Denault as a defendant and announcing that Bell had pleaded 
guilty to charges related to the overbilling scheme. Id. Denault was subsequently 
tried and convicted of his charges in November 2013. Id. at 89 n.3. 
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fraud were confirmed to Leidos, Inc. management in an internal 
audit report of March 9, 2011.110 Shortly thereafter, it became clear 
that the project would be a total loss.111 On June 29, 2011, Mayor 
Bloomberg wrote a letter to Leidos, Inc. demanding that the 
company reimburse NYC the estimated $600 million in 
overpayments.112 The CityTime debacle ultimately came to a close 
in March 2012, when Leidos, Inc. entered into a deferred 
prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s office, in which it 
admitted its responsibility for the kickback fraud scheme, and 
agreed to pay more than $500 million in penalties.113  
During the 2011–2012 period, Leidos, Inc. issued a number of 
public statements to investors, the most important of which proved 
to be the company’s annual disclosure document, known as Form 
10-K, filed with the SEC on March 25, 2011 (March 10-K).114 The 
March 10-K did not include any discussion of the difficulties facing 
the CityTime contract with NYC, nor the ongoing civil and 
criminal investigations of its employees that were involved in the 
project, despite the fact that Leidos, Inc. management had 
knowledge of those developments.115 Instead, those issues were not 
disclosed to investors until a series of releases that Leidos, Inc. 
issued during June and July of 2011, which, even then, arguably 
tended to downplay their significance.116  
                                                                                                     
110. Id. at 89. 
111. Id. 
 112. In re SAIC, Inc. Mem. & Order, No. 12-CV-1353, 2013 WL 5462289, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013). The Bloomberg letter also called for Leidos, Inc. to 
pay for the costs of the forensic investigation into the project, which, when 
combined with the reimbursement of overpayments, likely reduced any revenue 
earned by Leidos, Inc. on CityTime to nearly zero.  
 113. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2016). Leidos, Inc. also issued a 
“Statement of Responsibility” acknowledging the illegal conduct of Denault and 
Bell, taking responsibility for defrauding NYC. Id. Leidos, Inc. also admitted that 
it failed to take actions that would have detected the illegal conduct such as 
properly supervising Denault, controlling the costs of CityTime, or investigating 
anonymous ethics complaints alleging a kickback scheme. Id. In addition to $500 
million in fines, Leidos, Inc. agreed to forfeit over $40 million in unpaid 
receivables. Id.  
 114. Am. Compl., supra note 107, ¶ 109; Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 89. 
 115. Cert. Reply Brief at 7, In re SAIC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 12-CV-1395 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 30, 2013), 2013 WL 5462289; Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 95–96. Leidos, Inc. 
also issued an Annual Report to shareholders in March 2011 that did not mention 
the potential liability of the CityTime project. 
 116. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 90. On June 2, 2011, Leidos, Inc. finally issued a 
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The class plaintiff alleged that Leidos, Inc.’s March 2011 Form 
10-K, and related disclosures, omitted information required under 
Item 303’s MD&A rules, and therefore constituted securities fraud 
under Section 10(b) and Section 20(a) of the 34 Exchange Act.117 
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Leidos, Inc.’s knowledge of 
the CityTime fraud and the resulting material impact on the 
company was a “known[] trend or uncertainty” that should have 
been disclosed pursuant to Item 303.118 In the district court, those 
claims were eventually dismissed with prejudice over the course of 
three separate decisions issued by Judge Batts.119 Judge Batts’ 
substantive rationale for dismissing the case was laid out in an 
order of January 30, 2014, which concluded that the plaintiffs had 
failed to adequately plead the materiality and scienter elements, 
both of which are required under Section 10(b).120 The SDNY’s 
                                                                                                     
press release acknowledging the investigations into the CityTime contract. Id. 
The 8-K disclosed an ongoing joint criminal investigation by the U.S. Attorney 
and the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI). Id. The 8-K also stated 
that Leidos, Inc. had billed $635 million for the project, that it had $40 million in 
outstanding receivables, that Denault had been arrested for fraud, and that 
Leidos, Inc. had offered to refund NYC $2.5 million that Denault had billed as 
part of the kickback scheme. Id. The 8-K included language regarding the 
potential for adverse material effect that a possible fine or penalty could have on 
Leidos, Inc.’s consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows. 
Id. Leidos, Inc. filed its 10-Q the following day, June 3, 2011, with the same 
representations. Id. The June 2, 2011 Form 8-K also stated that Mayor Bloomberg 
had indicated that he would be seeking recovery of costs associated with 
CityTime, but that NYC had not yet filed a claim and therefore Leidos, Inc. had 
not recorded any liabilities other than the approximate $2.5 million it offered to 
refund after discovering Denault’s scheme. Id. 
 117. Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws 
¶¶ 77–78, 81, City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., No. 12 CV 
1353 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013), 2012 WL 590915 [hereinafter Compl.]; Am. 
Compl., supra note 107, ¶¶ 109–112. Plaintiff’s cause of action under Section 
20(a) is not of independent importance for purposes of this article. Section 20(a) 
claims are directed at individual officers and directors for “control person 
liability,” and are derived in part from a finding of liability under Section 10(b). 
 118. Am. Compl., supra note 107, ¶ 53. 
 119. See In re SAIC, Inc. Mem. & Order, 12-CV-1353(DAB), 2013 WL 
5462289, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (dismissing with leave to amend); In re 
SAIC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 12-CV-1353(DAB), 2013 WL 407050, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
30, 2014) (dismissing with prejudice, by granting defendant’s motion for 
reconsideration which argued that repleading the amended complaint would be 
futile); id. (dismissing plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on the prejudice 
issue). 
 120. In re SAIC, Inc. Mem. & Order., 2013 WL 5462289 at *4, *6. Specifically, 
the Order states that the “events alleged to have occurred between December 
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third and final order—which rejected plaintiffs’ motion to 
reconsider the dismissal of its claims with prejudice—was entered 
on September 30, 2014, and served as the basis for plaintiffs’ 
appeal to the Second Circuit.121 
2. The Second Circuit Opinion of Judge Lohier 
On March 29, 2016, a Second Circuit panel consisting of 
Judges Raymond Lohier, Gerard Lynch, and Susan Carney issued 
its decision in Leidos, with the opinion written by Judge Lohier.122 
The Second Circuit opinion reversed the SDNY decision, in part, 
by finding that plaintiffs had adequately pled materiality and 
scienter required for Section 10(b) with respect to the March 2011 
Form 10-K.123 The Second Circuit therefore held that the class 
                                                                                                     
2010 and March 2011 . . . are not enough to establish that the management 
(1) had knowledge that the company could be implicated in the CityTime project 
fraud or (2) could have predicted a material impact on the company . . . [and that 
the] alleged omissions were, at best a result of differences in professional 
judgment.” Id. Notably, Judge Batts’ decision is somewhat equivocal on the source 
of the claim at issue. It first frames Plaintiff’s averments concerning Item 303 as 
an “allegation” made in support of a Section 10(b) claim under the pleading 
requirements of the PSLRA, but paragraphs later preface the discussions of 
materiality and scienter with a reference to “Plaintiff’s Item 303 claim.” Compare 
id. at *3 (“A complaint alleging securities fraud ‘must [also] satisfy the heightened 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) by 
stating with particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud.’” (quoting 
Slayton v. Am. Express, Co., 604 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir.2010))), with id. at *11 
(“Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Item 303 fraud claims, with the exception of those related 
to the March 2011 Form 10–K, are DISMISSED with prejudice.”). 
 121. In re SAIC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 12 Civ. 1353(DAB), 2014 WL 4953614, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014). 
 122. See generally Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 123. Id. at 98. The Second Circuit addressed four allegations made in the 
plaintiff’s second amended complaint as applied to the March 2011 Form 10-K, 
the June 2011 Form 8-K, and the March 2011 Annual Report: (1) Leidos, Inc. 
failed to comply with GAAP when it omitted appropriate loss contingencies 
associated with CityTime, in violation of the Financial Accounting Standard No. 
5 (FAS 5); (2) Leidos, Inc. failed to disclose a known trend or uncertainty 
reasonably expected to have a material impact on its financial condition, as 
required by Item 303 of Reg. S-K; (3) Leidos, Inc. acted with scienter; and 
(4) Leidos, Inc. issued misleading statements regarding its “commitment to 
ethics” in its 2011 Annual Report to shareholders. Id. at 88. The Second Circuit 
also reversed with respect to the FAS 5 allegation, but otherwise affirmed the 
district court’s holdings regarding the June 2011 Form 8-K and the 2011 Annual 
Report. Id. at 98. 
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plaintiff should have been granted leave to further amend the 
complaint.124 Thus, the court vacated the SDNY’s order dismissing 
the 10(b) claims with prejudice, and remanded the case for further 
proceedings in the district court.125  
While the Second Circuit opinion is not necessarily a model of 
clarity with respect to the relationship between Section 10(b) and 
Item 303, a careful reading of the decision reveals a coherent 
analytical framework.126 The opinion, in pertinent part, begins 
with the observation that the Leidos class plaintiff has sued 
Leidos, Inc. for securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.127 The opinion then states that the issue on appeal is 
the sufficiency of allegations pled in support of that claim, 
including an assertion that Leidos, Inc. failed to comply with the 
disclosure requirements set forth in Item 303.128 Thus, although 
subsequent language muddies the waters slightly, the Lohier 
Opinion opens with the premise that Section 10(b) provides the 
relevant cause of action, and noncompliance with Item 303 is a 
factual allegation pled in support of that legal claim.129 
The Lohier Opinion then explains when an allegation that 
Item 303 has been violated is sufficient to plead a claim under 
Section 10(b), stating: “failure to comply with Item 303 can give 
rise to liability under Rule 10b-5 so long as the omission is material 
under Basic . . ., and the other elements of Rule 10b-5 have been 
established.”130 The Lohier Opinion then references the SEC’s 1989 
                                                                                                     
 124. Id. at 97. 
 125. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 88. Leidos, Inc. petitioned for a panel rehearing 
and a rehearing en banc, both of which were denied.  
 126. Id. at 92–96. 
 127. Id. at 91. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Admittedly, the Lohier Opinion then proceeds to follow the format of 
Judge Batts’ decisions, by describing the 10(b) cause of action and supporting 
allegations (failure to comply with Item 303, for example) interchangeably as 
“claims.” See, e.g., Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2016) (referring to 
“Plaintiffs’ FAS 5 [Financial Accounting Standard #5] Claim”); id. at 94 (referring 
to “Plaintiffs’ Item 303 Claim”); see also supra note 120 (citing to similar usage in 
Judge Batt’s orders). 
 130. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 94 n.7 (quoting Stratte-McClure v. Morgan 
Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis in original)). 
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Release, setting out Item 303’s particular materiality standard and 
knowledge requirement.131  
Both passages in the Lohier Opinion quote the earlier Second 
Circuit opinion in Stratte-McClure to reiterate the proposition that 
“Item 303 imposes an ‘affirmative duty to disclose . . . [that] can 
serve as a basis for a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b).’”132 
Having explained the legal framework at issue, the Lohier 
Opinion then proceeded to apply that analytical framework to the 
specific facts alleged by the Leidos plaintiffs in their proposed 
second amended complaint. Lohier found that Leidos, Inc. failed to 
comply with Item 303.133 The Lohier Opinion further found that 
the information omitted from the March 10-K was also materially 
misleading under Basic for purposes of Section 10(b).134 Lastly, the 
Lohier Opinion determined that the heightened pleading standard 
of scienter under Section 10(b) was also met.135 In light of these 
                                                                                                     
 131. Id. at 95 (quoting Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 
(2d Cir. 2015) (quoting the SEC 1989 Release)). The sentence cited from the SEC 
1989 Release is followed by footnote 27, which explicitly disclaims the equivalence 
of the materiality standard for Item 303.  
 132. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 94 n.7 (quoting Stratte-McClure v. Morgan 
Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015)).  
 133. The court applied the SEC’s Item 303 disclosure standard, which 
requires that the trend, event, commitment or uncertainty is (a) known to 
management; and (b) reasonably likely to have a material effect on the company’s 
financial condition or results of operations. Using this standard, the court 
assessed Leidos, Inc.’s arguments that plaintiffs failed to plead that Leidos, Inc. 
actually knew about the fraudulent scheme in March 2011, and that the CityTime 
contract was not material to Leidos, Inc.’s operations as a whole. The court 
disagreed with Leidos, Inc. See Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 94–
96 (2d Cir. 2016) (“We reject SAIC’s materiality argument, which asks us to 
consider quantitative factors only in the narrowest light in determining the 
financial impact of losing the CityTime project due to the fraud, and to otherwise 
ignore qualitative factors.”). 
 134. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 94–96. The court rejected Leidos, Inc.’s argument 
that its nondisclosures were immaterial by pointing out that Leidos, Inc. 
anticipated the sale of CityTime software, which was valued internally at 
approximately $2 billion; in addition, the liability exposure of Leidos, Inc. from 
criminal and civil investigations was severe, and could include potential 
debarment from future government contracts. Based upon these facts, the court 
held that it was “reluctant to conclude that the alleged misstatements were ‘so 
obviously unimportant’ [to reasonable investors] that they could not be material.” 
Id. (citing ECA, Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Tr. of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase 
Co., 553 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir. 2009)) (internal citations omitted). 
 135. The court held that the proposed second amended complaint allegations 
supported a strong inference that Leidos, Inc. knew about the CityTime fraud 
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findings, the Second Circuit held that the class plaintiff was 
entitled to re-plead its Section 10(b) claim with respect to the 
March 10-K.136  
It does not take a masterclass in statutory interpretation to 
parse out the logical structure between non-compliance with Item 
303’s required MD&A disclosures and actionable Section 10(b) 
claims articulated in the Lohier Opinion. As is repeated twice in 
the opinion, the former can give rise to the latter—meaning that it 
does under some circumstances, but not others. Therefore, a 
violation of Item 303 is not an automatic per se showing of 
securities fraud; nor does Item 303 function as some form of safe 
harbor, which shields MD&A disclosures (or lack thereof) from 
investor class actions under Rule 10b-5.137 Moreover, the Lohier 
Opinion pinpoints one of the necessary further conditions that 
dictates whether an instance of non-compliance with Item 303 is 
actionable as securities fraud: it must also be the case that the 
pleadings reflect facts that satisfy the Basic standard of 
materiality under Section 10(b), in addition to the alternative Item 
303 standard for materiality.  
B. Leidos at the Supreme Court 
In response to the Second Circuit’s decision to remand, Leidos, 
Inc. filed its Cert. Petition with the Court on October 31, 2016, the 
same day that the class plaintiff’s submitted revised pleadings 
                                                                                                     
prior to its March 2011 Form 10-K, and that Leidos, Inc. also likely knew it would 
have to repay a significant amount of the revenue it received from the contract. 
Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 94–96. The court also held that the liability exposure in 
Leidos, Inc. was distinguishable from that in In re Lion’s Gate Entertainment 
Corp. Securities Litigation, 165 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that 
issuers are not required to disclose the pendency of an SEC investigation), 
because Leidos, Inc. was aware it faced serious ongoing criminal and civil 
investigations. Moreover, Leidos, Inc. already had lost out on $150 million in 
potential additional contracts with NYC and New York State over the CityTime 
fraud. See Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 95 n.8 (“Rather, as alleged in the PSAC, by 
early March 2011 SAIC was aware that it faced serious, ongoing criminal and 
civil investigations that exposed it to potential criminal and civil liability and that 
ultimately did result in criminal charges and substantial liability.”). 
 136. Id.  
 137. Infra Part III.B.1. 
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before the SDNY.138 After several months of briefing on the Cert. 
Petition by the parties in Leidos, as well as third party amici, the 
Court granted the petition on March 27, 2017 and entered Leidos 
on the docket for its October 2017 Term.139  
1. The Cert. Petition & Alleged Circuit Split 
The premise of the Leidos Cert. Petition is twofold. First, the 
relationship between the disclosure requirements of Item 303 and 
the liability for nondisclosure under Section 10(b) is a core issue in 
securities law.140 And second, as a result of Leidos, there is now a 
“deep split of authority” among the federal circuit courts as to how 
that relationship is best understood.141 Accordingly, the Cert. 
Petition opens by framing the “Question Presented” to the Court 
by Leidos as follows: 
Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding—in direct conflict 
with the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits—that Item 
303 of SEC Regulation S-K creates a duty to disclose that is 
actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b–5.142 
                                                                                                     
 138. See generally Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of 
the Federal Securities Laws, In re SAIC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 12-CV-1353-DAB 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2016), 2016 WL 7838655 [hereinafter Second Am. Compl.]; 
Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3. 
 139. See Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (granting 
cert. from the Second Circuit). See generally Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3; Brief 
in Oppo to Pet. for Cert., supra note 19; Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19; 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 
20. Although firm dates have yet to be set for the Court’s review of the case, the 
most likely timeline is that it will hear oral arguments in late 2017 and issue a 
decision sometime in early-to-mid 2018. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 
OCTOBER 2017 TERM CALENDAR 1, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
2017TermCourtCalendar.pdf. 
 140. Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 10 (providing that Item 303 involves 
“issue[s] of central importance to private securities litigation”); id. at 32 (stating 
that the question presented relates to a “extensively litigated and critically 
important area of federal securities law”). 
 141. Id. at 1–2; see also id. at 6 (“The Second Circuit’s holding [in Leidos 
entrenched a deep and expressed circuit split”); id. at 10–11 (“Review by this 
Court is necessary to resolve a question that has deeply divided the circuit courts 
of appeals and to clarify the circumstances under which a duty to disclose arises 
for purposes of Section 10(b).”). 
 142. Id. at ii. 
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The Cert. Petition elaborates that the Second Circuit side of the 
split—which consists of Leidos, as well as Stratte-McClure—takes 
the position that a failure to comply with the terms of Item 303 is 
sufficient to automatically give rise to an actionable claim under 
Section 10(b) as well.143 That conclusion is in direct conflict with 
the Ninth Circuit, the argument proceeds, in light of its opinion in 
a case from 2014, NVIDIA, which can be read to suggest that 
non-compliance with Item 303 can never serve as a basis for 
Section 10(b) liability.144 In addition, the Cert. Petition contends 
that the Third Circuit is also aligned with the Ninth Circuit 
against the Second Circuit, based on its analysis in Oran. Lastly, 
according to the Cert. Petition, the need for the Court to resolve 
this core 2–1 split is particularly urgent because the split has 
already led to forum shopping by securities plaintiffs, and sown 
confusion among other federal appellate and district courts that 
have grappled with the same legal question.145 
The first point made by the Cert. Petition is well taken. The 
SEC’s rules on MD&A, which have been promulgated through 
Item 303 of Reg. S-K, are indeed important to the overall disclosure 
regime in securities law; likewise, Rule 10b-5 is the core 
enforcement mechanism for fraudulent disclosures.146 However, 
the second proposition—that Leidos has created a circuit split 
regarding the interaction between those regulations (or more 
precisely, escalated an existing split)—is demonstrably false. This 
can be shown by a close look at the leading cases in the Second, 
Third, and Ninth Circuits, which reveal that there is no real 
disagreement over the core legal question at issue in Leidos.147 
                                                                                                     
 143. Id. at 1–2. 
 144. See id. (“The Second Circuit answered that question in the affirmative 
and, in so doing, recognized that its ‘conclusion is at odds with the Ninth 
Circuit.’”).  
 145. See id. at 17 (“The present circuit split has led and will continue to lead 
to vastly disparate outcomes in the lower courts. Indeed, the split has already 
sown deep confusion among the district courts.”). The Cert. petition also points 
out that 6th and 11th Circuits are implicated as well. Id. at 2. 
 146. Supra Part II. 
 147. Leidos, Inc.’s petition for writ of certiorari hung entirely on one 
statement that, when read in its plain language, makes clear that there is, in fact, 
no distinguishable circuit split: “The Second Circuit holds that a company’s 
omission of disclosures required by Item 303 can subject it to 10(b) liability.” 
Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 10. Leidos, Inc. cites both the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Leidos, as well as Stratte-McClure, upon which the Second Circuit 
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The earliest in the line of cases is a Third Circuit opinion, 
Oran, written in 2000 by then-Circuit-Judge Samuel Alito. Oran 
was a securities class action in which investors in American Home 
Products Corporation (AHP) brought a Section 10(b) claim against 
the company based on its alleged failure to disclose information 
relating to its line of business in a variety of weight-loss drugs 
collectively known as “Fen-Phen.”148 The core of the Oran 
plaintiff’s legal argument was that, because AHP’s omissions 
relating to Fen-Phen constituted noncompliance with Item 303, 
the same nondisclosure also constituted a material omission for 
purposes of Rule 10b-5.149 The Third Circuit panel in Oran 
unanimously rejected the class plaintiff’s argument and affirmed 
the district court, which had dismissed the case with prejudice on 
the grounds that the complaint had failed as a matter of law to 
plead the required materiality element under Section 10(b).150 
Then-Circuit-Judge Alito’s opinion addressed the relationship 
between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 in detail.151 In doing so, it focused 
on the materiality test for Item 303 that the SEC set out in its 1989 
                                                                                                     
relied in Leidos, as the source of the statement, and the source of the circuit split. 
Leidos, Inc. conveniently fails to acknowledge the all-important footnote 7 from 
the Second Circuit’s Leidos opinion, wherein the court emphasizes that 10b-5 
liability is a possibility for omissions under Item 303, “so long as the omission is 
material under Basic, and the other elements of Rule 10b-5 have been established.” 
Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85, 94 n.7 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). 
 148. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining the 
basic facts of the case). The class plaintiff alleged that AHP learned about 
potential associations between Fen-Phen and heart disorders as early as 1995, 
but did not disclose this information until September 1997. See id. at 280 
(explaining the factual basis of plaintiff’s claim). 
 149. See id. at 287 (explaining the legal basis of plaintiff’s claim). 
 150. See id. at 291 (affirming the district court’s judgment dismissing 
plaintiff’s claim). 
 151. See id. at 287–89 (examining plaintiff’s argument in relation to Item 303 
and Rule 10b-5). Specifically, “whether the disclosure mandated under Reg. S-K 
303 is governed by standards consistent with those that the Supreme Court has 
imposed for private fraud actions [under Section 10(b)].” Id. at 287. Before 
addressing this relationship, the Third Circuit first clarified that violations of 
Item 303 do not create an independent cause of action for private plaintiffs. See 
id. (“In Burlington, this Court noted that ‘[i]t is an open issue whether violations 
of Item 303 create an independent cause of action for private plaintiffs. . . . Today, 
we hold that they do not.’”) (internal citation omitted). The court lists a long line 
of cases in agreement with this holding. See id. at 288 (listing cases ruling that 
an Item 303 disclosure violation “does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that 
such disclosure would be required under Rule 10b-5”).  
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Release, determining that the test “varies considerably from the 
general test for securities fraud set out by the Supreme Court in 
Basic.”152 As a result, the Oran opinion concluded that 
“demonstration of a violation of the disclosure requirement of Item 
303 does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure 
would be required under Rule 10b-5.”153 In Oran, the Third 
Circuit’s theory of the relationship between disclosure rules for 
MD&A and securities fraud claims is unambiguous, and should be 
familiar from the foregoing review of Judge Lohier’s opinion in 
Leidos,154 which also focused on the divergence in materiality 
standards that the SEC articulated in its 1989 Release.155 Far from 
being in conflict with the Third Circuit, then, Judge Lohier’s 
Opinion in Leidos is a near replication of Justice Alito’s analysis in 
Oran.156  
The Cert. Petition’s search for a disagreement between Leidos 
and the Ninth Circuit also falls short.157 In NVIDIA, the defendant 
disclosed to investors in early 2008 that two of its products 
contained defects.158 Shareholders brought a class action suit 
                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 288. The court quoted the SEC’s 1989 Release noting that “the 
probability/magnitude test for materiality approved by the Supreme Court in 
Basic . . . is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.” Id. According to the court, Reg. 
S-K’s 303 obligations “extend considerably beyond” those required by Rule 10b-5. 
Id. (quoting Exchange Release No. 34–26831, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22430 n.27). Based 
upon this reasoning, the court held that a violation of Item 303’s reporting 
requirements does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 
10b-5. See id. (“We find this reasoning persuasive, and thus hold that a violation 
of SK–303’s reporting requirements does not automatically give rise to a material 
omission under Rule 10b–5.”).  
 153. Id. at 288 (emphasis added). The Oran opinion then reiterated that same 
point in equivalent terms by repeating that “[w]e . . . thus hold that a violation 
for SK-303’s reporting requirements does not automatically give rise to a material 
omission under Rule 10b.5.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 154. See supra Part III.A.2 (summarizing Judge Lohier’s Leidos opinion). 
 155. See 1989 SEC Release, supra note 73, at 3–6 (discussing materiality 
standards under Item 303). 
 156. The word “can” carries the same meaning as the phrases “does not 
inevitably” and “does not automatically.” The reason is the clear distinction 
between materiality standards for Item 303 and for Section 10(b). See id. at 6 n.27 
(discussing the two materiality standards); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
238–39 (1988) (setting forth the Section 10(b) standard). 
 157. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 6–8 (discussing the split between 
the Second and Ninth circuits). 
 158. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(detailing the plaintiffs’ allegations).  
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against the company, alleging that NVIDIA knew about the 
defective products months before the 2008 disclosure.159 As in 
Oran, the NVIDIA plaintiffs once again argued that the defendant 
corporations had a duty to disclose under Item 303 because 
NVIDIA’s statements prior to the 2008 disclosure but after the 
discovery of the defects were misleading to investors, and therefore 
in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.160 The Ninth Circuit 
panel in NVIDIA unanimously affirmed the district court, 
upholding its dismissal of the case with prejudice on the grounds 
that plaintiffs had failed to plead the scienter element of Rule 
10b-5.161 
When the Ninth Circuit’s NVIDIA opinion delved into the 
intersection of compliance with Item 303 and the availability of 
Rule 10b-5 claims, it explicitly adopted the Third Circuit’s analysis 
of the same issue in whole, stating that “we are persuaded by 
[Oran’s] reasoning,” and proceeding to quote from Justice Alito’s 
Opinion for the conclusion that “because the materiality standards 
for Rule 10b-5 and Item 303 differ significantly, the ‘demonstration 
of a violation of the disclosure requirements of Item 303 does not 
lead inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would be 
required under Rule 10b-5. Such a duty to disclose must be 
separately shown.”162 In so holding, the opinion in NVIDIA was 
unequivocal on the relationship between Item 303 and Section 
10(b), repeating that “what must be disclosed under Item 303 is 
not necessarily required under the standard in Basic.”163 The Ninth 
                                                                                                     
 159. See id. at 1048 (“According to Plaintiffs, who had purchased NVIDIA’s 
stock in the preceding eight months, the company knew it would be liable for the 
defective products long before its 2008 disclosures. They claim that NVIDIA 
should have informed investors about the defects as early as November 2007.”).  
 160. See id. (“[Plaintiffs] further contend that, absent a disclosure about the 
product defects, NVIDIA’s intervening statements regarding its financial 
condition were misleading to investors, and consequently in violation of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and corresponding Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b–5.”).  
 161. See id. (“The district court below dismissed Plaintiffs’ amended 
complaint without further leave to amend, holding that it failed to adequately 
allege scienter, a necessary element for a claim under either Section 10(b) or Rule 
10b–5. . . . For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.”).  
 162. Id. at 1054–55 (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 
2000)).  
 163. Id. at 1055. Relying on Oran, the court reiterated that the SEC’s test for 
disclosure under Item 303 requires corporate management to make two 
THE LEIDOS MIXUP 991 
Circuit also emphasized that it was not breaking any new ground 
on the issue—in addition to referencing Oran, the NVIDIA opinion 
observed that its reasoning followed a multi-decade line of Ninth 
Circuit cases considering the same question.164  
In conforming to the reasoning of earlier Third and Ninth 
Circuit opinions, Leidos also does not contradict prior controlling 
precedents from its own court, the most important of which is the 
opinion written by Judge Livingston in Stratte-McClure.165 In 
Stratte-McClure, the Second Circuit held that “the failure to make 
a required disclosure under Item 303 is not by itself sufficient to 
state a claim for securities fraud under Section 10(b).”166 The 
court’s reasoning turned on the differing materiality standards in 
the two rules, invoking both the SEC’s 1989 Release as well as the 
interpretation of the SEC’s guidance in Justice Alito’s Oran 
opinion.167 The result, once again, is that non-disclosure under 
                                                                                                     
assessments: (1) whether the known trend, demand, commitment, event or 
uncertainty is likely to come to fruition; and (2) if management cannot make the 
first determination, disclosure is required unless management can determine 
that a material effect on the financial condition or results of operations is not 
reasonably likely to occur. See id. at 1055 (laying out the Item 303 test for 
disclosure (citing Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 34–26831, 54 Fed. Reg. 
22427, 22430 (May 24, 1989))).  
 164. See id. at 1054 (“We have confronted a similar argument before.”) (citing 
In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Lyondell 
Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050, 1053 (1993); In re Convergent Tech. 
Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also In re Pac. Gateway Exch., 
Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C–00–1211 PJH, 2002 WL 851066, at *13 n.10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
30, 2002) (citing Oran and other cases deciding the same question); Alfus v. 
Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“This court 
continues to find that defendants did not violate Rule 10b–5 by failing to comply 
with Item 303.”). 
 165. Stratte-McClure involved Section 10(b) claims based in part on 
allegations that defendant had failed to disclose trends in financial products 
during the financial crisis that were required to be disclosed under Item 303. See 
Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[Plaintiffs] 
allege that Morgan Stanley and six of its officers and former officers . . . made 
material misstatements and omissions . . . in an effort to conceal Morgan 
Stanley’s exposure to and losses from the subprime mortgage market.”). As with 
NVIDIA, the Stratte-McClure affirms dismissal based on a failure to plead 
scienter, but also discussed the intersection of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 at length. 
See id. (affirming the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim). 
 166. Id. at 102. 
 167. See id. at 101–04 (comparing the Oran standard to the standard in the 
SEC’s 1989 Release).  
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Item 303 “can” give rise to a claim under Section 10(b), but 
“only . . . if” it also satisfies the materiality element outlined in 
Basic.168 In other words, the Livingston Opinion in 
Stratte-McClure is in accord with Justice Alito’s opinion in Oran, 
as well as subsequent application of Justice Alito’s reasoning 
quoted by the Ninth Circuit in NVIDIA.169 The logic in all three 
cases is simple: while not every Item 303 violation will give rise to 
Section 10(b) liability, some Item 303 violations also can give rise 
to violations of Rule 10b-5.  
Stratte-McClure, however, does present one wrinkle. The Cert. 
Petition seizes on a portion of the Livingston Opinion that 
describes its analysis as being “at odds” with the Ninth Circuit in 
NVIDIA.170 There is less to that declaration than appears at first 
glance.171 The first reason that the Livingston Opinion supplies—
“the Ninth Circuit’s implication that . . Item 303 violations are 
never actionable under 10b-5”—is simply a misreading of 
NVIDIA.172 The second reason given by the Livingston Opinion 
involves a side-skirmish over a parallel line of cases, which deal 
with the relationship between Item 303 and private investor 
claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the 33 Securities Act, a question 
                                                                                                     
 168. See id. at 104 (“[W]e conclude that a violation of Item 303’s disclosure 
requirements can only sustain a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 if the 
allegedly omitted information satisfies Basic’s test for materiality.”).  
 169. Compare Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 107 (“We conclude that . . . a 
failure to make a required disclosure under Item 303 of Regulation S–K . . . is an 
omission that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim, if 
the omission satisfies the materiality requirements outlined in Basic.”), with In 
re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, we hold 
that Item 303 does not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b–5. Such a duty to disclose must be separately shown according to the 
principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic and Matrixx Initiatives.”), and 
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We find this reasoning persuasive, 
and thus hold that a violation of SK–303’s reporting requirements does not 
automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b–5.”). 
 170. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 11 (“In Stratte-McClure, the 
Second Circuit expressly acknowledged its split with the Ninth Circuit on the 
Item 303 issue, stating: [O]ur conclusion is at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s recent 
opinion in [NVIDIA].” (internal quotations omitted)). Notably, the Leidos Petition 
for Certiorari does not attribute the “at odds” comment upon which the circuit 
split is ostensibly based. The statement is found in Stratte-McClure, not Leidos. 
 171. At least for the immediate purpose of identifying a disagreement over 
the question presented in Item 303 cases such as Leidos. Parts III & IV below 
draw out the bigger picture issues that this confusion inadvertently tees up. 
 172. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103. 
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that the Ninth Circuit does not reach in NVIDIA and that is only 
referenced in passing by the opinion in that case.173 Therefore, 
despite its directness on the point, Stratte-McClure never identifies 
a genuine source of disagreement with the Ninth Circuit over the 
question presented in Leidos. Tellingly, in the Lohier Opinion in 
Leidos, there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of the Ninth 
Circuit, NVIDIA, or an inter-circuit conflict of any kind.174 
In summary, an inspection of the 2–1 circuit split alleged in 
the Cert. Petition reveals a 3–0 consensus with respect to the core 
legal question at issue in Leidos: the Second Circuit (Leidos and 
Stratte-McClure) agrees in full with the Third Circuit (Oran), 
which in turn is entirely consistent with the Ninth Circuit 
(NVIDIA and its many predecessors).175 The Cert. Petition’s claim 
that cases from the Eleventh Circuit,176 Sixth Circuit,177 or First 
                                                                                                     
 173. Compare id. at 103 (“[W]e conclude that a violation of Item 303’s 
disclosure requirements can only sustain a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b–5 if the allegedly omitted information satisfies Basic’s test for materiality.”), 
with NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1055 (“In relevant part, Item 303 requires corporate 
management to ‘[d]escribe [in 10-K and 10-Q forms] any known trends or 
uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a 
material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from 
continuing operations.’”); see also infra Part III.  
 174. See generally Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2016) (lacking discussion 
of NVIDIA or the Ninth Circuit). 
 175. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 107–08 (2d Cir. 
2015) (ruling that failure to disclose under Item 303 can give rise to a Section 
10(b) claim); Oran, 226 F.3d at 288 (ruling that, while an Item 303 failure can 
give rise to a Section 10(b) claim, it did not in this case); NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 
1055–57 (citing Oran and ruling that an Item 303 failure does not automatically 
give rise to a Section 10(b) claim). 
 176. The Eleventh Circuit case that the Cert. Petition references, Thompson 
v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 2010) is even less relevant. 
The case deals with Rule 10b-5, but Item 303 only receives passing mention as 
part of a 40-page concurrence, which is primarily concerned with the argument 
that the plaintiff’s securities fraud claims were so frivolous that its counsel should 
be sanctioned for misconduct. When a substantive discussion of Item 303 does 
arrive, it deals with Reg. S-B (not Reg. S-K), and consists of a footnote that 
summarily agrees with Justice Alito’s analysis in Oran. Id. at 682 n.78. 
 177. The Sixth Circuit case at issue, In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 
involved claims under Section 10(b), and included a discussion of Item 303, but 
the court noted that Item 303 did not appear in the complaint at all. See id. at 
402 (“Indeed, Item 303 is not even cited in the complaint.”). It then speculated in 
passing that a disclosure obligation under Rule 10b-5 may “perhaps” stem from 
Item 303—but did not explore the notion further because it found that plaintiff’s 
alleged omission was so tenuous that no violation of either Item 303 or Rule 10b-5 
had taken place. See id. at 403 (“The plaintiffs suggest . . . that the absence of a 
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Circuit178 are incompatible is also incorrect, as is the assertion that 
the scattered district court decisions on point are mired in 
confusion.179 By contrast, the most salient feature of Leidos is that, 
on the core legal issue in question, there is near unanimity among 
the courts.180 This finding raises some puzzles regarding the 
Court’s decision to issue a writ of certiorari in the first place, which 
presumably reflects at least partial agreement with the analysis 
presented in the Cert. Petition.181 It also indicates that the Court’s 
resolution of Leidos, had it been forthcoming, may not have tracked 
the course that the litigating parties and most other commentators 
anticipated.182 
                                                                                                     
separate cause of action does not preclude plaintiffs from arguing . . . that 
defendants’ disclosure duty under the Rule 10b-5 claim may stem from Item 303. 
Perhaps so . . . [but] we do not find the argument persuasive.”). 
 178. See generally Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 179. See, e.g., Beaver Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 
F. Supp. 3d 1035 (D. Minn. 2015) (“The Second Circuit’s reasoning is persuasive 
and consistent with this Court’s reading of Oran. The analytical framework 
outlined in Stratte–McClure for Item 303 allegations does not conflict with the 
holding of Oran and will be applied accordingly.”); Ash v. Powersecure Int’l, Inc., 
2015 WL 54444741, at *10–11 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2015) (expressly adopting the 
reasoning in Oran, that Item 303 violations can only give rise to 10(b) claims so 
long as they plead the additional elements specific to 10(b)); Simon v. Am. Power 
Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 (D.R.I. 1996) (“The Court concludes that 
[Item 303] imposed an obligation to disclose the discovery of the defect in its first 
quarter 10–Q report, even though the effects of the discovery would not be 
realized for accounting purposes until the next quarter.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 107–08 (ruling that failure to 
disclose under Item 303 can give rise to a Section 10(b) claim); Oran v. Stafford, 
226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000) (ruling that while an Item 303 failure can give 
rise to a Section 10(b) claim, it did not in this case); In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 
768 F.3d 1046, 1055–57 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Oran and ruling that an Item 303 
failure does not automatically give rise to a Section 10(b) claim); see also supra 
Part III.B.1; supra note 175 and accompanying text (noting that circuits are in 
agreement that an Item 303 failure does not automatically gives rise to a Section 
10(b) claim). 
 181. The NVIDIA Cert. Petition, which contains an identical question 
presented, was denied by the Court. Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2349 
(2015); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., No. 
14-975 (U.S. 2015), 2015 WL 603147  
Question Presented: Whether Item 303 of Regulation S-K forms the 
basis for a duty to disclose otherwise material information for purposes 
of an omission actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 as the Second Circuit recently held in direct 
conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case? 
 182. See generally Matthew C. Turk & Karen Woody, Leidos and The Roberts 
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2. The Leidos Settlement and Supreme Court Opinion It 
Foreclosed 
In an unusual twist to an already unusual case, the parties in 
Leidos announced a tentative settlement weeks before the 
Supreme Court was set to hear oral argument, and have 
successfully moved to hold the case in abeyance on the Court’s 
docket until the proposed settlement is ultimately rejected or 
approved.183 If the settlement is not approved by the Southern 
District of New York by spring of 2018, Leidos will be back on the 
Supreme Court’s docket for the October 2018 term.184 To date, the 
terms of the settlement have not been disclosed. While it is 
therefore quite difficult to speculate at the particular litigation 
strategy that drove the parties’ settlement calculus, it is worth 
noting that Leidos will not be the first securities law case in recent 
years that was withdrawn from the Court’s docket prior to oral 
argument. In a 2014 case, Public Employees’ Retirement System v. 
IndyMac MBS, Inc.,185 which asked whether filing a securities 
class action tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the 
class, the Court held—just one week prior to scheduled 
argument—that certiorari had been improvidently granted.186 And 
in 2013, the parties in UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Union de 
Empleados de Muelles187 settled two months after Cert. was 
granted.188  
                                                                                                     
Court’s Improvident Securities Law Docket, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 89 (2017) 
(discussing implications of the Leidos case for the Supreme Court’s broader 
securities law jurisprudence under Chief Justice John Roberts). 
 183. See generally Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., No. 16-581, 2017 WL 
4622142 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2017) (granting stay of argument in the case).  
 184. See id. (holding Leidos in abeyance). 
 185. 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014). 
 186. See id. at 42 (“Writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit dismissed as improvidently granted.”). 
 187. 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013). 
 188. See id. at 40 (dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari on August 26, 
2013); see also UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Union de Empleados Muelles, 133 S. Ct. 
2857 (2013) (granting Cert. on June 24, 2013). Another interesting precedent is 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, which was settled shortly before the Court’s grant of 
certiorari, yet ultimately produced a Supreme Court opinion on the question 
presented despite the pending settlement. 569 U.S. 27 (2013). See also id. 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (dissenting in part on the grounds that “we would 
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted”).  
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Putting the settlement aside, it is still worth addressing how 
the Court should (and likely would) have decided Leidos, had the 
opportunity materialized. On the one hand, the Cert. Petition 
paints the picture of a complex case, in which the Court must adopt 
one side of a contentious circuit split over crucial interpretive 
difficulties in securities law. On the other hand, a careful look at 
the underlying legal authorities suggests that Leidos actually 
presents relatively straightforward legal questions. Rather than 
crafting a creative solution to the supposed clash among the 
circuits, the Court probably will affirm Leidos in summary fashion, 
both with respect to the Second Circuit’s reversal of the SDNY’s 
dismissal of the case, as well as the underlying legal analysis that 
the Lohier Opinion relies upon to do so.  
A reversal of the Second Circuit’s determination in Leidos 
seems unlikely because the facts alleged in the class plaintiff’s 
pleadings easily meet the required materiality and scienter 
standards for purposes of stating a claim under Section 10(b).189 
CityTime was one of the most important projects under contract at 
Leidos, Inc., and, by the time its March 2011 Form 10-K was 
issued, the CityTime deal had essentially collapsed due to a brazen 
fraud scheme that both NYC and federal authorities were actively 
prosecuting.190 If that is not a material fact, nothing is.191 The 
Leidos plaintiffs’ pleadings also established that, a week before the 
March 10-K was released, management at Leidos, Inc. were briefed 
on the CityTime issues in the form of a final report from an 
internal investigation commissioned in light of preexisting 
concerns over the project.192  
                                                                                                     
 189. See Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2016) (discussing the 
materiality and scienter arguments, finding for the plaintiff). 
 190. See supra Part III.A.1 (reviewing the factual allegations in Leidos). 
 191. Leidos, Inc.’s stock price fell roughly 25% as the problems with CityTime 
gradually became public knowledge during this period, and did not begin to 
rebound until late 2011. See Leidos Holdings, Inc. (LDOS), YAHOO! FIN., 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/LDOS/history?p=LDOS (last visited Apr. 26, 
2017) (listing historical prices for Leidos Holdings stock) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); cf. In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 
714 (3d Cir. 1996) (using a much less significant metric—a 5%–10% drop in 
quarterly net income—as a benchmark rule of thumb for determining whether 
nondisclosed subject matter is material). 
 192. See supra Part III.A.1 (reviewing the factual allegations in Leidos). 
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Pleading scienter often presents a challenging hurdle that 
requires tying together chains of circumstantial evidence in order 
to make an inference of fraud, or even reckless behavior, 
plausible.193 By contrast, the allegations in Leidos provide 
compelling evidence that Leidos, Inc. had actual knowledge of the 
undisclosed material facts at issue, which is the most robust 
showing of scienter that is practically possible.194 These points 
reflect an additional oddity about Leidos. Namely, that the lack of 
any discernible justification for the SDNY’s dismissal with 
prejudice means the case should never have reached the Second 
Circuit, let alone the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In affirming the Leidos decision, the Court would also likely 
have followed the same underlying legal analysis that was applied 
in the Lohier Opinion, for a number of reasons.195 Most 
importantly, as discussed above, there is no circuit split that 
provides a counterargument, or even introduces disagreement, on 
this point.196 And, in addition to reflecting the consensus position 
of other federal courts, the Lohier Opinion also has the virtue of 
being legally sound. The SEC has explicitly opined that the 
definition of materiality used for MD&A disclosures differs from 
                                                                                                     
 193. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 551 U.S. 308, 319–22 (2007) 
(discussing various standards for pleading scienter); see also Coffee, Jr., Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, supra note 94, at 978–85 (discussing the 
pleading standard for scienter, as codified under the 1995 PSLRA); cf. Donald C. 
Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case Against 
Martha Stewart that Never Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 5–8 (2006) 
(comparing “purpose” and “awareness” standards for scienter). 
 194. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2016)  
[T]he allegations in the PSAC strongly suggest that . . . when SAIC 
received the results of its internal investigation but before it filed its 
10–K, SAIC knew about Denault’s kickback scheme, the extent of the 
CityTime fraud . . . and that it risked civil and criminal fines and 
penalties, let alone losing a significant number of current and future 
government contracts. We conclude that the allegations support the 
inference that SAIC acted with at least a reckless disregard of a known 
or obvious duty to disclose . . . . 
 195. That is, that an allegation of noncompliance with Item 303 can in some 
circumstances sustain an actionable claim under Section 10(b) but does not do so 
automatically, because securities plaintiffs must further show that the elements 
unique to Rule 10(b)-5, such as the Basic materiality standard, have also been 
met. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the Second Circuit’s Lohier Opinion in 
Leidos). 
 196. See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the Leidos Cert. Petition). 
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the standard applicable to securities fraud claims.197 Lastly, the 
Lohier Opinion tracks the reasoning of at least one member of the 
Court, Justice Alito, whose opinion for the Third Circuit in Oran 
laid out the blueprint that subsequent Second and Ninth Circuit 
decisions have followed, including Leidos.198 
Thus, it was never very likely that the Supreme Court would 
have pronounced that the Second Circuit erred in finding 
violations of Item 303 and claims under Rule 10b-5 to be 
functionally distinguishable. Such a conclusion would require 
ignoring the interpretative authority of the SEC, the plain 
language of the two materiality standards themselves, and the 
bulk of the scholarly research that compares them.199 To be sure, 
the fact that this article’s analysis of Leidos departs from the Cert. 
Petition’s theory of the case is not necessarily a startling result. 
Petitions to the Court are exercises in legal advocacy just like any 
other lawyer’s brief, and tend to cast the case in the most 
controversial and grandiose terms possible. Moreover, an order 
granting Cert. does not always indicate that the Court has bought 
into the claims presented in the Cert. petition, and cases might be 
taken up to clarify tangentially related issues.200  
                                                                                                     
 197. See 1989 SEC Release, supra note 73, at 6 n.27 (“MD&A mandates 
disclosure of specified forward-looking information, and specifies its own 
standard for disclosure—i.e., reasonably likely to have a material effect. This 
specific standard governs the circumstances in which Item 303 requires 
disclosure. The probability/magnitude test for materiality . . . in Basic . . . is 
inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.” (internal citation omitted)).  
 198. Compare Lohier Op., 818 F.3d at 96 (allowing qualitative factors in the 
materiality determination), with Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 
2000) (explaining then-Judge Alito’s materiality framework). But cf. Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 27 (2011) (highlighting that Justice 
Alito joined the majority opinion, which rejected certain aspects of the materiality 
analysis that the Third Circuit used in Oran). 
 199. See Oran, 226 F.3d at 287 (noting the SEC’s interpretive authority on its 
disclosure rules, including Item 303). One provocative alternative scenario is that 
the Court finds the cases in all three circuits to be wrongly decided, based on 
theory that the gap between the materiality standards of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 
exists but is too trivial to matter at that pleading stage, and is only relevant in 
securities class actions for purposes of an ultimate finding of liability. 
 200. Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and 
Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (2012) (contrasting the “dispute 
resolution” and “law declaration” models that are used to explain how the 
Supreme Court exercises its discretion to select cases for review). 
THE LEIDOS MIXUP 999 
What is remarkable about Leidos, however, is that the 
narrative urged by the Cert. Petition reappears unchanged in 
essentially all other commentary on the case. The universal failure 
to unravel the Cert. Petition’s alleged circuit split, and to 
acknowledge that Leidos is in fact an easy case, call for an 
explanation. The most obvious source of responsibility can be 
attributed to the decision in Stratte-McClure, which declared that 
the Second Circuit is “at odds” with the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Item 303 in NVIDIA.201 But that is a superficial 
source of the problem; a quick cross-reference of the relevant 
passage in the Livingston Opinion reveals that it turns on stray 
language in NVIDIA that does not raise a genuine dispute over the 
question presented in Leidos.202  
How did Leidos work its way to the brink of a Supreme Court 
decision? This is a critical question, given that the core legal 
question presented in Leidos does not reflect any genuine dispute 
among federal appellate courts. As will be argued, one explanation 
for the Leidos mix-up concerns the relevance of a parallel line of 
cases, which consider the relationship between Item 303 and 
actions brought pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of the 33 Securities 
Act.203 Another source of confusion relates to the interaction 
between the duty to disclose MD&A information, set forth Item 303 
of Reg. S-K, and securities fraud claims under Section 10(b) of the 
34 Exchange Act.204 These issues are addressed in turn by the 
subsequent two Parts below. 
                                                                                                     
 201. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015). This 
language is cited in the first paragraph of the Statement of the Case in the Leidos 
petition for Cert., yet does not arise from the lower court decision in Leidos. Judge 
Livingston argues in dicta that the NVIDIA court erroneously implies that Oran 
“compels a conclusion that Item 303 violation are never actionable under 10b-5.” 
Id. (emphasis in original).  
 202. See supra Part III.B (analyzing the Leidos case).  
 203. This concept, and its broader application to the field of securities 
regulation, will be addressed in Part III. With its review of Leidos, the Court will 
be resolving a securities class action that brings fraud claims under Section 10(b) 
of the 34 Exchange Act, and turns on allegations relating to Item 303 periodic 
filings under that same statute. As part of the SEC’s integrated disclosure system 
under Reg. S-K, however, Item 303 requires that the same MD&A information be 
included in a separate set of disclosures mandated under the 33 Securities Act, 
which are private suits under Sections 11 and 12 of that act. See supra Parts I–II 
(discussing the applicable law and Leidos, respectively).  
 204. See supra Parts II–III (discussing the different duties of disclosure). 
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IV. Nondisclosure Claims & the 33 Securities Act 
This Section unravels the underlying cause of the controversy 
over 33 Securities Act claims that arise in Leidos. It shows how the 
supposed circuit split on the topic is much less substantial than an 
overlooked intra-court split, wherein the Second and Ninth 
Circuits’ analysis of Item 303 and Section 10(b) implicitly 
contradict their own line of opinions on Item 303 and Sections 11 
and 12.205 Generally, the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that 
Item 303 violations can give rise, in a per se fashion, to liability 
under the 33 Securities Act.206 Yet cases in the same circuits 
brought under Section 10(b) find that Item 303 violations merely 
have the possibility of creating liability, provided that materiality 
standards are met.207 Thus, placing the Sections 11 and 12 cases 
in proper perspective alongside their Section 10(b) counterparts 
carries broad implications. The discussion below addresses this 
conundrum, and provides reflections on what the incoherence in 
this area of the law says about judicial interpretation of securities 
regulation more broadly. 
A. Origins of the 33 Securities Act Muddle in Leidos 
The Cert. Petition in Leidos twice attempts to conjure up a 
circuit split over 33 Securities Act cases.208 In framing the issue, 
                                                                                                     
 205. See infra Part IV.C (explaining the split between the Second and Ninth 
Circuits). 
 206. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104 (“The Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
in NVIDIA also misconstrues the relationship between Rule 10b–5 and Section 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. In Litwin and Panther Partners, we established 
that Item 303 creates a duty to disclose for the purposes of liability under Section 
12(a)(2).” (citing Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 716 (2d Cir. 
2011))); see also Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Comm’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114 (2d 
Cir. 2012); Steckman v. Hart Brewing Inc., 143 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 207. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 107–08 (“We conclude that, as a 
matter of first impression in [the Second Circuit], a failure to make a required 
disclosure under Item 303 . . . can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities 
fraud claim, if the omission satisfies the materiality requirements.”); In re 
NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[The Ninth Circuit 
has] never directly decided whether Item 303’s disclosure duty is actionable under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5. We now hold that it is not.”).  
 208. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 1–2, 8 (“This case presents a deep 
split of authority with respect to one of the most important—and frequently 
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the Cert. Petition claims, “unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second 
Circuit thought it both relevant and persuasive that a number of 
prior decisions, including two of its own, held that Item 303 
omissions were actionable under Sections 11 and 12.”209 The Cert. 
Petition later flips the point by stating that the Ninth Circuit 
“rejected plaintiff’s reliance on Second Circuit cases” that 
examined when Item 303 is actionable under Sections 11 and 12 of 
the 33 Securities Act.210 Because the Lohier Opinion in Leidos does 
not reference the Ninth Circuit at all, the Cert. Petition grounds 
both claims in the passage211 from Stratte-McClure where Judge 
Livingston announced the Second Circuit’s disapproval of the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in NVIDIA.212 The specific language from 
Stratte-McClure is therefore most revealing of the relevant bases 
for the Cert. Petition’s assertions.213  
                                                                                                     
invoked—provisions of the federal securities laws.”). 
 209. Id. at 8. 
 210. Id. at 14. 
 211. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in NVIDIA also misconstrues the relationship 
between Rule 10b–5 and Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.”). 
 212. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 8, 14 (citing Stratte-McClure for 
both propositions). Interestingly, the Lohier Opinion in Leidos references these 
two Second Circuit cases cited in the Cert. Petition only to establish the point that 
the “trend or uncertainty” required by Item 303 must be affirmatively known to 
the issuer. Lohier Op., 818 F.3d 85, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2016). In other words, a 
reckless or negligence standard of “should have known” is not applicable for Item 
303. The Lohier Opinion does not discuss liability under Sections 11 and 12 at all. 
 213. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104  
In Litwin and Panther Partners, we established that Item 303 creates 
a duty to disclose for the purposes of liability under Section 
12(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit had also adopted that 
position. In NVIDIA, a panel of the Ninth Circuit found these decisions 
irrelevant to its interpretation of Rule 10b–5. But Section 12(a)(2)’s 
prohibition on omissions is textually identical to that of Rule 10b–5: 
both make unlawful omission of material fact[s] ... necessary in order 
to make ... statements, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. SEC regulations, like Item 303, dictate the 
contents of mandatory disclosures—be they Form 10–Qs in the case of 
Rule 10b–5 or prospectuses in the case of Section 12(a)(2)—and are 
therefore an essential part of the circumstances under which such 
disclosures are made. Litwin and Panther Partners recognized that 
issuing financial statements that omit elements required by Item 303 
can mislead investors. Those decisions provide firm footing for our 
decision in this case.  
(internal citations and quotation omitted). 
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The Stratte-McClure decision, written by Judge Livingston, 
accuses the NVIDIA court of “misconstru[ing] the relationship 
between Rule 10b-5 and Section 12(a) of the [33] Securities Act.”214 
The Livingston Opinion proceeds by noting that NVIDIA found 
three decisions concerning Item 303 and Sections 11 and 12 
irrelevant—a pair of Second Circuit cases, Panther Partners Inc. v. 
Ikanos Communications, Inc.215 and Litwin v. Blackstone Group, 
L.P.,216 along with a precedent from the Ninth Circuit, Steckman 
v. Hart Brewing, Inc.217 (Steckman).218 According to Judge 
Livingston, ignoring the holdings in those cases was a mistake, 
because “[Section 12 prohibitions] on omissions is textually 
identical to that of Rule 10b-5.”219 Because Litwin and Panther 
Partners established that Item 303 creates a duty to disclose for 
purposes of Sections 11 and 12, the Second Circuit was on “firm 
footing” in transporting the same conclusion to the Section 10(b) 
context.220 
The logic of the Livingston Opinion’s critique appears 
plausible at first blush, but does not fare well under further 
scrutiny. A premise of the argument is that, by failing to 
incorporate the logic of the 33 Securities Act cases that discuss 
Item 303, NVIDIA came to an incorrect conclusion in the Section 
10(b) context. But the Livingston Opinion’s attempt to undercut 
the Ninth Circuit on these grounds amounts to a non sequitur 
because the Stratte-McClure and NVIDIA decisions are in full 
agreement: each case held that Item 303 violations can, under 
                                                                                                     
 214. Id. Early portions of the Livingston Opinion make clear that the Ninth 
Circuit’s misconstrual pertains to Section 11 as well as Section 12. See id. at 101 
(“[The Second Circuit has] already held that failing to comply with Item 303 by 
omitting known trends or uncertainties from a registration statement or 
prospectus is actionable under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 
1933.” (citing Panther Partners, 681 F.3d at 120; Litwin, 634 F.3d at 716; J&R 
Mktg. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2008); Silverstrand Inv’rs 
v. AMAG Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 95, 102–03, 107 (1st Cir. 2013))).  
 215. 681 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 216. 634 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 217. 143 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 218. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104 (citing Steckman for the proposition 
that the Ninth Circuit adopted the position that “Item 303 creates a duty to 
disclose for the purposes of liability under Section 12(a)(2)”).  
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. 
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some circumstances, also give rise to fraud claims under 10(b), but 
do not automatically do so in every case.221 Even more oddly, the 
Stratte-McClure decision is itself in tension with the very same 
Section 12 cases that Judge Livingston argues should have served 
as a template for NVIDIA.222 With some ambiguities aside, the 
thrust of the 33 Securities Act opinions is that non-compliance 
with Item 303 functions as a per se “surrogate” for securities law 
private rights of action in every case.223 Yet if the same analysis 
applies across both 34 Exchange Act and 33 Securities Act cases, 
as Livingston contends, and if the two lines of cases also call for 
different outcomes, then it follows that one entire series of Item 
303 cases has been wrongly decided. Thus, the stakes of the 
convoluted crossfire between the circuits in this area are 
potentially quite high, and it is worth parsing out what exactly the 
33 Securities Act cases hold. 
B. The Parallel Caselaw on Sections 11 & 12 
A review of the three precedents concerning Sections 11 and 
12 suggests that they do not apply the same analysis as the cases 
analyzing Section 10(b). This is undeniably the case with the Ninth 
Circuit precedent, Steckman, which cannot be reconciled with 
Stratte-McClure. It is also the most natural reading of the Second 
Circuit precedents, Litwin and Panther Partners, although they 
are far from clear, and susceptible to varying interpretations. 
In Steckman, plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that 
defendants failed to disclose in the registration statement and 
prospectus that sales and earnings had plateaued prior to the 
initial public offering.224 The defendant underwriters argued that 
even if the plaintiffs had stated a claim sufficient to show a 
violation of Item 303, their showing was not sufficient to state a 
                                                                                                     
 221. See id. at 103–04 (“At a minimum, Oran is consistent with our decision 
that failure to comply with Item 303 in a Form 10–Q can give rise to liability 
under Rule 10b–5. . . .”); In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
 222. See infra Part IV.B (discussing other case law on Sections 11 and 12).  
 223. See id. (same). 
 224. See Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1295 (laying out the factual basis of the 
plaintiffs’ claim). 
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cause of action under Sections 11 and 12.225 In other words, the 
underwriters argued that Item 303 cannot serve as a surrogate for 
Sections 11 and 12 liability.226 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and 
seemingly created a bright-line rule: “[A]ny omission of facts 
‘required to be stated’ under Item 303 will produce liability under 
Section 11.”227 In defense of this premise, the court cited a Third 
Circuit decision, Craftmatic Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow,228 
which included the following stark statement: “[D]isclosures 
mandated by law are presumably material.”229 The Steckman court 
further stated that the same standard for Section 11 claims applies 
for Section 12(a)(2) liability.230 Curiously, however, the Steckman 
court declined to extend the same logic to Section 10(b) claims, 
distinguishing such liability on the basis that Section 10(b) “has 
only an implied right of action” and therefore “differs significantly 
from Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 33 Securities Act, which have 
express rights of action.”231  
                                                                                                     
 225. See id. at 1296 (“The [defendants] also argue . . . that Steckman’s 
pleadings, even if they did state the elements required to show a violation of Item 
303 . . . would not be sufficient to state a cause of action under the Securities 
Act.”). 
 226. See id. (“The [defendants] also argue that an alleged violation of [Item 
303] does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action under sections 11 and 
12(a)(2).”); see also Benjamin, supra note 88, at 9 (noting the Steckman 
defendants’ argument).  
 227. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 228. 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 229. Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296 (citing Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d at 
641 n.17). Steckman creates the presumption that any omission, material or not, 
required by Item 303 automatically gives rise to liability under Sections 11 and 
12. Taken to its logical conclusion, Steckman creates a per se statutory violation 
giving rise to automatic Section 11 and 12 liability for any omission or 
misstatement of all mandated, but not necessarily material, information. 
 230. See id. (“Allegations which state a claim under Item 303(a) of Regulation 
S–K also sufficiently state a claim under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2).”). 
 231. See id. (declining to extend the rationale of In re VeriFone Securities 
Litigation, 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993), because it involved a claim under Section 
10(b), not Sections 11 or 12). Despite equating Item 303 and Sections 11 and 12 
liability standards, the court nevertheless affirmed the district court’s dismissal 
of the complaint in Steckman, finding that management could not have expected 
a sales and earnings slowdown to have a material impact on net sales, revenues 
or income. See id. at 1297–98 (“Pyramid’s management could not under any 
imaginable standard have reasonably expected that the slowdown was anything 
more than a regular fourth quarter slowdown or that it would have a material 
impact on net sales, revenues or income.”). 
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In Litwin, defendant Blackstone Group, L.P. declined to 
disclose in its registration statement and prospectus that two of its 
portfolio companies, and its real estate fund, were experiencing 
problems due, in part, to the real estate crash, and that those 
problems substantially affected Blackstone’s revenues.232 
Dismissing the complaint, the district court ruled that Sections 11 
and 12 do not require disclosure of publicly available information 
such as macro-economic conditions.233 Further, the district court 
held that plaintiffs had failed to allege any facts that would render 
Blackstone’s affirmative statements misleading, nor had plaintiffs 
alleged that Blackstone knew that the market conditions would 
have a material effect on its investments.234 On appeal, the Second 
Circuit ruled that Item 303 required Blackstone to disclose the 
omitted information of real estate trends, provided the information 
was material.235 The Second Circuit thereby remanded to the 
district court, allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint.236 
Thus, according to Litwin, Item 303 clearly establishes a duty to 
                                                                                                     
 232. See Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 710 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]wo of Blackstone’s portfolio companies as well as its real estate fund 
investments were experiencing problems. Blackstone allegedly knew 
[that] . . . these problems to subject it to a claw-back of performance 
fees . . . thereby materially affecting its future revenues.”).  
 233. See id. at 714 (“The District Court further found that . . . Sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) do not require disclosure of publicly available information: ‘The omission 
of generally known macro-economic conditions is not material because such 
matters are already part of the ‘total mix’ of information available to investors.’” 
(citation omitted)).  
 234. See id. (“[T]he District Court noted that the complaint contained no 
allegations that Blackstone knew that market conditions were reasonably likely 
to have a material effect on its portfolio of real estate investments.” (emphasis 
original) (internal quotation omitted)).  
 235. See id. at 722 (“[T]he alleged misstatements and omissions regarding 
real estate were qualitatively material because they masked a potential change 
in earnings or other trends.”). The court ruled that the pleading standard for 
Section 11 places a minimal burden on the plaintiff, such that a material omission 
of information necessary to prevent existing disclosures from being misleading 
gives rise to liability. See id. at 716 (“Section 11 places a relatively minimal 
burden on a plaintiff.” (internal quotation omitted)). The court also stated that 
the same standard applies to Section 12(a)(2) claims. See id. at 715 (stating that 
“Section 12(a)(2) imposes liability under similar circumstances. . . .” as Section 
11). Thus, to overcome a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, only proof of a material 
omission is required.  
 236. See id. at 723 (vacating the District Court’s judgment and remanding). 
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disclose material information, giving rise to liability under 
Sections 11 and 12.237  
Likewise, in Panther Partners, the Second Circuit held that 
plaintiffs adequately alleged that defendants had not sufficiently 
disclosed, both in the registration statement and prospectus, the 
extent of the defect in their semiconductor product, in violation of 
Item 303.238 Relying on its holding in Litwin, the court 
acknowledged that Item 303 provided the basis for the duty to 
disclose; the court then performed a fact-based analysis and held 
that plaintiffs should have been granted leave to amend their 
complaint because the defect “might reasonably be expected to 
have a material impact on future revenues.”239 In its conclusion, 
the court stated that plaintiffs adequately alleged that defendants 
had “failed to comply with Item 303.”240 This sentence manifests 
the confusion swirling among these cases, given that Item 303 is 
not a cause of action in itself; instead, the cause of action in 
Panther Partners was a violation of Sections 11 and 12.241 
                                                                                                     
 237. See id. (holding that “plaintiffs plausibly allege that Blackstone omitted 
from its Registration Statement and Prospectus material information related to 
its investments in FGIC and Freescale that Blackstone was required to disclose 
under Item 303 of Regulation S–K”). The materiality requirement balances 
against the risk of information overload. See id. at 722 (explaining how the 
materiality requirement reduce informational burdens on financial institutions). 
The court also noted that the test for materiality under Sections 10(b) and 
Sections 11 and 12 is identical. See id. at 719 n.10 (“[T]he test for materiality is 
the same when claims are brought pursuant to Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act.”). But cf. J&R Mktg., SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 397 
(6th Cir. 2008) (citing the duty to disclose under Item 303 applies to material 
information only); Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Son, Inc., 719 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (citing Litwin for the holding that failure to comply with an SEC 
regulation can trigger liability under Section 11). 
 238. See Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 120 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“We hold that the [plaintiffs] plausibly alleges that the defect issue, 
and its potential impact on [defendant’s] business, constituted a known trend or 
uncertainty that Ikanos reasonably expected would have a material unfavorable 
impact on revenues or income from continuing operations.”). 
 239. Id. The court also made clear that Item 303’s disclosure obligations were 
similar to materiality under the federal securities laws’ anti-fraud provisions in 
that they “do not turn on restrictive mechanical or quantitative inquiries.” Id. at 
122. 
 240. Id. at 122. 
 241. See id. at 119–20 (explaining that Sections 11 and 12 impose liability for 
certain misstatements and misrepresentations). 
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The contrast between the reasoning in this line of 33 
Securities Act cases and the parallel 10(b) decisions such as Leidos 
can be conveyed through the excerpts reviewed above. The gulf 
becomes stark, however, when the opinions are read as a whole. 
For example, none of the 33 Securities Act cases express 
agreement with Oran, which holds that Item 303 can give rise to 
Section 10(b) liability. Nor do any of the 33 Securities act cases 
note the driving principle of the Third Circuit’s decision in Oran, 
which turns on the distinction between the materiality standard 
under Item 303 and Basic.242 By contrast, all of the relevant 34 
Exchange Act precedents leading up to Leidos include extensive 
discussions of the respective materiality standards, expressly 
adopt the position introduced by Oran, and make the distinction a 
central focus of the legal framework used in each case.243 As a 
result, parallel sets of caselaw can be viewed as sorting themselves 
into two camps. While the 33 Securities Act cases are generally 
aligned with the conclusion that Item 303 violations function as a 
per se surrogate for claims under Sections 11 and 12,244 the 34 
Exchange act cases uniformly reach the conclusion that 
noncompliance with Item 303 may serve as a basis for Section 10(b) 
actions but only if certain further conditions are also met. 
C. Resolving the Intra-Circuit Split over Item 303 
The preceding discussion demonstrated that the parallel lines 
of cases that examine Item 303 reach divergent outcomes, 
depending on whether the underlying claims are based on Section 
10(b) or Sections 11 and 12.245 Whether the legal analyses behind 
those disparate approaches are sound is a separate question. One 
possibility, suggested in the vast majority of cases that have 
considered the issue, including NVIDIA, is that the two lines of 
                                                                                                     
 242. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 243. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100–04 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (discussing and comparing the standards under Item 303 and Section 
10(b)). 
 244. The Livingston Opinion provides some mild confirmation on this point 
by lumping Panther Partners and Litwin with Steckman. See id. at 104 
(discussing Panther Partners, Litwin, and Steckman all in the same context). 
 245. See supra Part IV.B (comparing Item 303 cases based on Section 10(b) 
claims with those based on Sections 11 and 12 claims). 
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cases simply call for entirely different analysis, rendering any 
intersection irrelevant. The alternative position, articulated 
primarily by Judge Livingston in Stratte-McClure, is that the same 
analysis must hold across these lines of cases.246 If that is so, then 
it is not possible for all of these cases to have been rightly decided, 
given that they end up with different resolutions regarding Item 
303’s reach.  
Judge Livingston appears to have a better argument on this 
point. She points out that Section 12(a)(2)’s requirement to disclose 
material omissions is “textually identical to that of Rule 10b-5.”247 
Livingston’s reasoning on Section 10(b) liability, therefore, is as 
follows: because the 33 Securities Act and 34 Exchange Act 
Sections have an identical materiality standard,248 and because the 
33 Securities Act cases hold that Item 303 omissions give rise to 
liability under those claims, it therefore follows that Item 303 also 
gives rise to liability under Section 10(b) of the 34 Exchange Act.  
By comparison, the attempts to distinguish the various causes 
of action are less persuasive. Steckman, for example, states: 
“Section 10(b) . . . has only an implied right of action, differ[ing] 
significantly from Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) . . . which have express 
rights of action.”249 The Oran court also seemed to apply this 
distinction.250 Panther Partners and Litwin also recite a litany of 
distinctions between 10b and Section 11 and 12 in the pleading 
                                                                                                     
 246. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104 (finding that Section 10(b) cases 
are relevant to Section 12 decisions). 
 247. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (prohibiting deceptive practices 
in securities exchanges). 
 248. See Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 178 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The test 
for whether a statement is materially misleading under Section 12(a)(2) is 
identical to that under Section 10(b) and Section 11: whether representations, 
viewed as a whole, would have misled a reasonable investor.”). 
 249. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 250. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000)  
In Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc. . . . Ninth Circuit held that 
allegations which state a claim under SK-303 also sufficiently state a 
claim under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange (sic) 
Act. The court carefully limited its holding, however, making clear that 
it not extend to claims under Section 10(b) or Rule 
10-b5. . . . Accordingly, Steckman does not support plaintiffs’ claims 
here.  
(internal citation omitted). 
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context.251 NVIDIA, quoting Steckman and Panther Partners, 
stated that “Section 10(b) of the [34] Exchange Act . . . differs 
significantly from Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the [33] Securities 
Act for the following reasons: (1) liability under Sections 11 and 12 
arises from an omission in contravention of an affirmative legal 
disclosure obligation,”252 whereas there is “no such requirement” 
under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5;253 and (2) Sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) claims do not require proof of scienter, and therefore are 
not subject to heightened pleading standards.254 Finally, and 
arguably most important, the Leidos Cert. Petition attempts to 
distinguish Section 10(b) from Section 11 only, conceding that the 
liability for Section 12(a)(2) is identical to Section 10(b), and likely 
indistinguishable.255 The Cert. Petition notes that Section 11 
imposes strict liability for omissions of material facts and, given 
that Congress easily could have changed that standard to match 
that of 12(a)(2) and 10(b), Section 11 cases should be handled 
differently.256  
                                                                                                     
 251. See Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 120 
(2d Cir. 2012) (comparing Section 10b pleading standards with standards for 
Sections 11 and 12); Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 715–16 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (examining the pleading requirements under Item 303 and Sections 11 
and 12). 
 252. In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d. 1046, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(internal quotation omitted).  
 253. See id. at 1056 (reiterating that “material information need not be 
disclosed unless omission of that information would cause other information that 
is disclosed to be misleading”). As Livingston points out, however, the Section 
12(a)(2) standard instead is identical to that of Section 10(b). Stratte-McClure v. 
Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015) (“But Section 12(a)(2)’s 
prohibition on omissions is textually identical to that of Rule 10b-5.”). 
 254. See NVIDIA, 768 F.3d. at 56 (“Furthermore, as noted in Panther 
Partners, scienter is not an element of either a Section 11 or Section 12(a)(2) 
claim. Such claims are not subject to the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards 
unless based on allegations of fraud.” (internal citation omitted)).  
 255. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 15 (“The distinction between 
Section 10(b) and Section 11 is crucial . . . .”).  
 256. See id. at 15–16  
The absence in Section 10(b) of language imposing affirmative legal 
disclosure obligations[—]which was expressly included in Section 
11[—]strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to 
impose disclosure liability under Section 10(b) for omissions based on 
regulatory disclosure obligations. . . . If Congress wanted to impose 
Section 10(b) liability for failing to disclose information required to be 
stated in SEC filings, it could have easily (and expressly) done so, just 
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The analytical gymnastics undertaken by these decisions 
evinces the judicial evasion of the central point: there is no 
relevant distinction between the requirements for claiming a 
material omission under Section 10(b), and Sections 11 and 12. A 
pleading standard is irrelevant; an implied versus express right of 
action is irrelevant; the liability threshold (after a material 
omission has been pled) is irrelevant. What is relevant, and an 
element of each of these claims, is that the omission be material. 
The logic presented above in Part II.B plays out here: Item 303 
omissions can give rise to liability under Sections 10(b), and so too 
under Sections 11 and 12, provided that the Basic standard of 
materiality is met. The implication, therefore, is that Steckman 
and its progeny are incorrect. The broader irony inherent in the 33 
Securities Act cases is that they manifest an intra-circuit split and 
expose the logical inconsistencies of the Section 10(b) cases.  
D. The Missing Systemic Perspective on Securities Regulation 
The logical inconsistencies that run through the case law 
analyzed above have implications that go beyond Item 303 and are 
relevant to much broader issues in securities law.257 As the 
following discussion will argue, they are symptomatic of more 
general interpretative problems that are introduced by the unique 
legal structure and historical evolution of federal securities law.  
A brief timeline of policymaking in securities law is sufficient 
to show that, despite a pattern of constant change, the one constant 
in that regulatory regime has been its overwhelming complexity. 
Starting with the New Deal Era, a central feature of federal 
securities regulation was that it developed in an extremely 
fragmented and piecemeal fashion.258 After three decades of 
disorderly expansion,259 the increasingly unwieldy nature of that 
                                                                                                     
as it had done the year before.  
(internal citation omitted).  
 257. See supra Part IV.C (examining caselaw on Sections 10, 11, and 12). 
 258. See Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous 
Disclosure Requirement, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 138 (1998) (“The United States 
federal government has grown its disclosure system from the bottom up, 
accumulating layers of specific statutes, regulations, rules, schedules, and 
items.”). 
 259. The regulatory regime lacked a unified approach from its outset due to 
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process led to a shift in policymaking priorities that began in 1960s 
and 70s, which equated to a focus on reforms that could provide a 
more streamlined and cohesive system.260  
By the 1980s, concrete progress was made toward a more 
integrated disclosure model, but those rules fell well short of 
providing a completely unified policy framework. The structure of 
securities regulation in its current form cobbles together elements 
from across each of these prior periods, and therefore encompasses 
an elaborate sprawl of legal authorities that are subtly 
interconnected along certain dimensions, yet function in isolation 
along others.261  
The legal questions presented in Leidos and Item 303 cases 
potentially tee up some of the more intricate systemic relationships 
                                                                                                     
the bifurcated framework put in place by the 33 Securities Act and 34 Exchange 
Act. See generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990). The patchwork nature of 
disclosure requirements provided in those statutes was further exacerbated over 
the following decades, as the SEC issued an avalanche of formal and informal 
policy directives and a freewheeling body of judicial doctrines was spun out of the 
federal courts. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Securities Regulation By Louis Loss & Joel 
Seligman, 46 BUS. LAW. 1895, 1895 (1991) (quoting contemporary accounts of the 
“staggering mass of material” that the SEC produced during the 1940s 50s, and 
60s). 
 260. See Mary Jo White, The Path Forward on Disclosure, Speech at the Nat’l 
Assoc. Corp. Directors—Leadership Conference 2013 in National Harbor, Md. 
(Oct. 15, 2013) (summarizing the history of disclosure reform efforts). See 
generally Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 
(1966) (providing an influential call for a more integrated disclosure system). The 
landmark achievement to that end arrived in 1980, when the SEC established an 
integrated disclosure format pursuant to Reg. S-K. See SEC Reg. S-K Release 
(1977). See also Milton H. Cohen, The Integrated Disclosure System: Unfinished 
Business, 40 BUS. LAW. 987 (1985) [hereinafter Cohen, Unfinished Business]. See 
generally Edward F. Greene, Integration of the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 75 (1981). To a certain extent, disparate parts 
of the policy machinery were also stitched together by federal court decisions, for 
example in the consensus among circuit courts that an identical materiality 
standard that applies across the private causes of action under Section 10(b), 
Section 11, and Section 12.  
 261. See Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—the SEC is Riding Off in Two 
Directions at Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781, 787 (2016) (“[D]isclosure regulations have 
created an extremely complicated regime . . . disclosure polices . . . are [] scattered 
through SEC Forms, interpretative releases, no-action letters and comment 
letters on SEC filings, and have been articulated by the courts in a variety of 
securities cases.”); see also Cohen, Unfinished Business, supra note 260, at 989 
(discussing how securities regulation has changed over time). 
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in the securities regulation framework outlined above.262 What 
stands out in those opinions, however, is how consistently they 
converge on a common strategy, which is to seize upon any 
available distinction that allows the legal materials to be examined 
as narrowly as possible. A good example is Steckman, a case 
regarding 33 Securities Act claims, wherein the Ninth Circuit 
declined to apply the reasoning of its 34 Exchange Act cases, 
without further explanation, after simply stating that the private 
right of action for Section 10(b) is implied, rather than express as 
in Sections 11 and 12.263 Even that head-scratching non sequitur 
is more rigorous than the reasoning of some other decisions, 
however. Many cases do not bother to identify a particular point of 
comparison between the statutory provisions at issue, and instead 
invoke a blanket conclusion that the 33 Securities Act and 34 
Exchange Act claims are simply different, in various ways.264 The 
noteworthy aspect of these decisions is not that they are mistaken 
or unpersuasive; rather, it is that they do not reflect a credible 
effort to identify the relevant universe of legal authorities. In other 
words, the spurious distinctions that pop up from all corners in 
those cases are simply avoidance tactics, intended to preclude any 
confrontation with the more complicated aspects of the legal issues 
under analysis. 
One objection to this characterization of the Item 303 cases is 
that they merely reflect the common judicial policy of only 
addressing legal issues that are strictly necessary to be reached. 
The problem is that, although that practice may be a prudent way 
to reduce legal error in many contexts, securities regulation 
presents a special case where this procedure may prove 
dysfunctional. In the securities law context, the interpretive 
challenge is to acquire a systemic perspective on the legal elements 
in question in order to determine whether any particular rule 
should be analyzed on its own terms or in conjunction with other 
                                                                                                     
 262. See supra notes 251–253 and accompanying text (providing opinions 
with different perspectives). 
 263. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(stating that the Exchange Act has an implied right of action). 
 264. See supra Part IV.C (“One possibility, suggested in the vast majority of 
cases that have considered the issue, including NVIDIA, is that the two lines of 
cases simply call for entirely different analysis, rendering any intersection 
irrelevant.”). 
THE LEIDOS MIXUP 1013 
authorities. A myopic view that begins by taking the disclosure 
rules in isolation, on the other hand, threatens to miss the forest 
for the trees, and a façade of judicial conservatism is likely to 
increase the incidence of legal error. Confirmation of these points 
is provided by the substantial misdirection of judicial resources 
that has taken place in Item 303 cases. The blinkered analyses in 
those decisions have culminated in the granting of Cert. in Leidos, 
where the Court has sacrificed its scarce docket space in order to 
resolve a line of precedents that are both legally sound and in full 
agreement; meanwhile, broad swaths of case law within the circuit 
courts that address similar issues have avoided scrutiny, despite 
the incompatible outcomes they produce.  
The lackluster judicial performance in the Item 303 context 
conforms to a broader pattern of decisionmaking in securities law, 
which is documented in an important article by Stephen 
Bainbridge and Mitu Gulati.265 In their paper, Bainbridge and 
Gulati provide an extensive catalogue of the rhetorical tools and 
doctrinal devices that allow federal judges to circumvent the 
complicated legal questions that often arise in securities 
litigation.266 As a result, judges often dispose of securities fraud 
cases on the simplest grounds possible.267 Bainbridge and Gulati 
argue that, although these judicial strategies are often defended 
on various grounds, the underlying policy rationales tend to be 
weak.268 Instead, the doctrinal shortcuts they identify are better 
explained by a combination of judicial boredom with the 
technicalities of securities regulation, psychological aversion to 
complexity, and institutional constraints such as overcrowded 
dockets.269 Bainbridge and Gulati mainly focus on shortcuts judges 
use when applying particular substantive legal standards, such as 
                                                                                                     
 265. See generally Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 34. But cf. Donald C. 
Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create “Good” Securities Fraud Doctrine?, 
51 EMORY L. J. 309, 310 (2002) (arguing that the claims made by Bainbridge and 
Gulati are overstated in certain respects). 
 266. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 34, at 91 (discussing the “doctrinal 
development” of the “Herculean model of adjudication,” which “seeks to 
demonstrate that the rule is the economically efficient one”). 
 267. See id. at 90 (arguing that judges often try to “dispose” of cases on simple 
threshold issues). 
 268. See id. (referring to this as a “systematic failure”).  
 269. See id. (discussing the reasons for the practice of disposing of cases on 
the simplest grounds possible). 
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materiality or scienter,270 but the same underlying logic fits the 
case law on Item 303 as well. The opinions in those cases reflect on 
an analogous set of analytical moves, which are used to reduce the 
complexity of legal authorities under consideration, and also tend 
to yield poorly reasoned results. 
While it may be inevitable that generalist judges operating 
within the administrative constraints of federal courts will take a 
reductive approach to securities law cases, the problem is 
magnified by the fact that legal scholarship on securities 
regulation shares some of the same shortcomings. The primary 
culprit for this overly narrow perspective is a tendency of the 
literature to fixate on securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5 to 
the exclusion of other regulatory policies or statutory provisions.271 
As with Bainbridge and Gulati’s analysis of federal judges, there 
are a number of plausible theories for how the particular 
institutional incentives facing securities law professors may have 
skewed this scholarly output.272 But regardless of the explanation, 
                                                                                                     
 270. See id. at 87 (stating that the analysis focuses on “materiality and 
scienter”). 
 271. One clear manifestation of this is the crowded field of securities fraud 
topics in the literature, which often focus on debates concerning each particular 
element of a Section 10(b) fraud claim. See generally Anne M. Lipton, Reviving 
Reliance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 91 (2017); Donald Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge 
Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third Party Liability Under 
Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125 (2010); Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: 
Causation and the Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811 (2008). Another 
generic problem appears in articles that approach topics exclusively from the 
perspective of Rule 10b-5, despite the applicability of the underlying questions to 
other areas of the securities law. See generally Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 
34 (arguing that judges avoid the technical details of securities fraud cases, but 
limiting its review of judicial decision-making to the relatively well understood 
doctrine relating to securities fraud cases); Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36 
(analyzing Item 303 cases with respect to 10b-5 but not Section 11 or Section 12). 
 272. Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that Rule 10b-5 securities 
fraud claims are the one area that may be familiar or of interest to outside 
audiences, who may regard the remainder of the field as tedious arcana. 
Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 34, at 107 (“‘High profile’ and ‘controversial’ are 
almost never words used to describe securities class action cases.”). A related 
reason is that the legal academy pays inordinate attention to the Supreme Court 
relative to its decisions’ practical impact on the law, and Section 10(b) is the only 
section of the securities law that gets addressed by the Court with any regularity. 
See Donald C. Langevoort, Words From on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s 
History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 865 (1995) (“A securities 
law decision by the United States Supreme Court is an extraordinary event, 
especially when it deals with the centerpiece antifraud requirement, Rule 
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the practical result is that, in securities litigation cases presenting 
complex issues that strain the institutional capacity of federal 
courts, judges often cannot fall back on a body of scholarship that 
systematically clarifies how the dispute fits within the broader 
structure of securities regulation. Leidos once again provides a 
compelling illustration of this point, as the case has been widely 
misunderstood in academic commentary, which tends to dig no 
deeper than culling loose bits of language that the Cert. Petition 
pulls from decisions such as Stratte-McClure. 
V. The Duty to Disclose 
While the alleged dispute over Sections 11 and 12 precedents 
raises a number of puzzles of its own and carries significant 
implications that are not widely appreciated, the duty to disclose 
issue has received greater exposure in early commentary on 
Leidos, and has been the subject of greater scholarly attention in 
general. This section analyzes the duty to disclose as the second 
source of the Leidos mix-up. Part A begins by identifying how the 
duty to disclose issue has become a point of controversy in the 
relevant caselaw and scholarly commentary. Part B walks through 
the most prominent theory of how the duty to disclose doctrine 
should be interpreted in securities fraud cases relating to Item 303. 
It then explains why applying that analysis does not provide a 
useful framework for understanding the legal questions that are 
presented to the Court in Leidos. Part C closes by arguing that the 
confusion which the duty to disclose has generated in Leidos is 
typical of more general problems with the role that the doctrine 
plays in securities regulation.  
                                                                                                     
10b-5.”). A final factor may be that the continuous ebb-and-flow in the scope of 
securities fraud class actions provides a convenient platform for simplistic 
normative battles over whether securities law should be more “pro-defendant” or 
“pro-investor.” See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down: A Critical Essay 
on Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448, 448–
49 (2009) (“Given the current leaning of the Supreme Court, victory for the 
defendants in Stoneridge was probably predictable. Nevertheless, the decision is 
worth academic discussion because it illustrates how utterly irrational the law 
governing private securities fraud actions has become.”). 
1016 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957 (2018) 
A. Origins of the Leidos Mixup over the Duty to Disclose 
The putative conflict in Leidos concerning the duty to disclose 
is raised at the outset of the Cert. Petition, which frames the 
question presented to the Court as the need to resolve a “direct 
conflict” among the circuit courts over the issue of 
“[w]hether . . . Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K creates a duty to 
disclose that is actionable under Section 10(b)” of the 34 Exchange 
Act.273 The Cert. Petition’s primary basis for that claim is Judge 
Livingston’s opinion in Stratte-McClure, which declares that it is 
“at odds” with the Ninth Circuit (NVIDIA) over the question of 
whether an Item 303 disclosure duty is actionable under Section 
10(b).274 The result is that commentary on Leidos is dominated by 
a working assumption that the Court must intervene in a judicial 
disagreement over the circumstances in which Item 303’s 
requirements “trigger” a duty to disclose that gives rise to a Rule 
10b-5 claim in securities fraud cases.275 
The underlying source of that perspective can be traced, in 
part, to a seminal article on disclosure by Donald Langevoort and 
Mitu Gulati (L&G) entitled The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under 
Rule 10b-5.276 The L&G article not only sets forth an influential 
interpretation of the specific legal question at issue in Leidos,277 
but has also had a relatively direct impact on the development of 
that case. In Stratte-McClure, the Livingston Opinion cites to L&G 
immediately before declaring a conflict between the Second and 
Ninth Circuits over the duty issue.278 The certiorari briefing to the 
                                                                                                     
 273. Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at i (emphasis added). 
 274. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015); see 
also Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 2 (quoting the same passage from 
Stratte-McClure). 
 275. See supra note 20 (referencing sources that defend this proposition). 
 276. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1640 (discussing the 
controversy surrounding the duty to disclose). 
 277. See id. at 1648 (discussing how the MD&A disclosures and Section 10(b) 
fraud claims interact). The L&G article is principally concerned with the 
interplay between the MD&A disclosures and a fraud claims under Section 10(b)). 
Id.  
 278. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (“It follows that Item 303 imposes 
the type of duty to speak that can, in appropriate cases, give rise to liability under 
Section 10(b).” (citing Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1640)). 
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Court refers to arguments contained in the L&G article, as well.279 
Thus, through a somewhat circuitous route, the origins of the 
alleged circuit split lies within L&G’s theory of the duty to disclose. 
As its title suggests, the main thrust of the L&G article is that 
there is a pervasive incoherence in judicial decisions that grapple 
with securities claims under Section 10(b) that are based on 
allegedly fraudulent omissions.280 The L&G thesis proceeds from 
the premise that the “two central and required elements in any 
securities fraud case are materiality and a duty to disclose.”281 The 
source of the analytical muddle in securities fraud caselaw, they 
suggest, is a failure to maintain a clear conceptual distinction 
between those two elements.282 In support of this argument, L&G 
point to the Third Circuit’s decision in Oran, where then-Judge 
Alito’s opinion is said to represent a leading “illustration of courts 
confusing duty and materiality.”283 
The line of reasoning that is filtered down from L&G and into 
Leidos is itself somewhat of a muddle in need of clarification. One 
issue is that, despite L&G’s critique of Oran, Justice Alito’s 
analysis in that case appears sound, and has been followed by 
other circuit courts that have considered the same issue.284 
Another wrinkle involves the Second Circuit’s Stratte-McClure 
decision, which relies on both the Langevoort and Gulati article 
and the holding in Oran when announcing that its duty analysis is 
in conflict with that of the Ninth Circuit.285 Because L&G argue 
that Oran was wrongly decided, however, the strange result is that 
the Livingston Opinion in Stratte-McClure wields a pair 
authorities against the Ninth Circuit that appear to contradict one 
                                                                                                     
 279. Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at 
20–21. 
 280. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1647 (pointing out the 
disagreement regarding fraudulent omissions). 
 281. Id. at 1643. 
 282. See id. at 1650–51 (“In court opinions on the fraud question, it is often 
hard to determine whether the judge is basing her decision on materiality or 
duty.”). 
 283. Id. at 1651. 
 284. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Justice Alito’s opinion). 
 285. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“It follows that Item 303 imposes the type of duty to speak that can, in 
appropriate cases, give rise to liability under Section 10(b).”). 
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another.286 A final oddity is that, while the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Leidos purports to follow Stratte-McClure, Judge 
Lohier’s opinion in that case does not include more than a limited 
discussion of the duty issue and fails to note any tension with the 
Ninth Circuit’s view of the doctrine.287 Taken together, then, the 
caselaw and scholarship surrounding Leidos reflect a baffling 
crisscross of agreements and disagreements over the duty issue 
that calls for further explanation. 
B. Clarifying the Duty to Disclose Under Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 
In order to resolve the confusion over the duty to disclose that 
enters Leidos through Judge Livingston’s reading of the L&G 
article, it is helpful to take a close look at the latter’s argument, 
which begins with their definition of “duty.”288 On a first pass, L&G 
state that “duty . . . refers to whether there is an obligation to 
disclose a certain category of information.”289 “Materiality,” by 
contrast, “refers to the matter of whether a piece of information 
would likely be important to the reasonable investor.”290 According 
to L&G, this conceptual distinction is critical, because determining 
whether a securities fraud defendant was subject to a duty to 
disclose is a freestanding part of the judicial inquiry in Section 
10(b) claims, and one that necessarily precedes the question of 
materiality.291  
When applying this framework, L&G conclude that Justice 
Alito’s Oran opinion erred by not sequencing its reasoning into two 
                                                                                                     
 286. Compare id. (citing both Oran, and Langevoort and Gulati favorably), 
with Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1651 (referring to Oran as 
problematic). 
 287. Supra Part III.A.2. 
 288. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1644 (“Duty, by contrast, 
refers to whether there is an obligation to disclose a certain category of 
information.”). 
 289. Id. (citing COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION § 10.4 (4th ed. 2004)). 
 290. Id. 
 291. See id. at 1643–44 (“Conceptually though, in order to provide a 
meaningful discussion about the duty question, we have to separate it carefully 
from the materiality question.”); see also id. at 1644–45 (“[I]t is important to keep 
the two concepts separate . . . . Any suggestion that materiality and duty are the 
same would disturb [] foundational elements [of the securities regulation] 
architecture.”). 
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separate steps. First, the analysis must begin by asking the “duty 
question,” which “is simply whether violations of this particular 
category of disclosure requirements [here, Item 303] have the 
potential to mislead.”292 Second, if courts answer that initial 
question in the affirmative, they may “then go on to the question of 
whether the particular violation was material.”293 The L&G 
reading of Oran puts some meat on the bones of their otherwise 
vague articulation of how the duty to disclose doctrine applies in 
securities fraud cases. The two key moves are to equate the duty 
concept with a legal obligation to avoid statements that are 
misleading, and to anchor the source of those statements in the 
specific line item disclosures that the SEC requires firms to include 
in their public filings.294 
1. Issues with the Conventional Analysis of Disclosure Duties 
for Rule 10b-5 
Structuring the duty to disclose analysis as L&G suggest is 
problematic, however, because it obscures an important aspect of 
the legal obligation imposed by Rule 10b-5. Namely, a misleading 
line-item disclosure is neither sufficient nor necessary for a 
statement to be actionable under Section 10(b). As a consequence, 
the “category of information” which L&G argue is covered by the 
duty to disclose in the context of securities fraud claims is both 
under-inclusive and over-inclusive. 
On one hand, focusing the duty question on violations of 
particular line-items such as Item 303 is too narrow, given that 
Rule 10b-5 forbids fraudulent statements in many contexts that do 
not involve the SEC’s specific disclosure categories.295 The 
presence of a line-item requirement is not a necessary precondition 
                                                                                                     
 292. Id. at 1651. 
 293. Id. 
 294. A “line-item” is any content that is specifically required to be included in 
a firm’s public filings under the SEC’s disclosure rules. In addition to MD&A 
under Item 303, other examples include quantitative financial data under Reg. 
S-X, as well as qualitative information presented in narrative form on subjects 
such as “risk factors” facing a firm or summaries of any ongoing “legal 
proceedings.” 
 295. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (providing a broad prohibition against 
fraud). 
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for a Section 10(b) claim for two reasons. First, securities fraud 
actions may be premised on deceptive statements that are made to 
investors in any form.296 It is common for courts to recognize claims 
based on informal press releases or interviews by management 
that are published in the business press.297 Second, even in the 
context of disclosures filed with the SEC, a Rule 10b-5 claim can 
be supported by the omission of information that does not 
correspond to any particular line-item requirement. One notable 
illustration of this point is a recent series of class actions against 
companies such as Target, Inc., which turned on the alleged failure 
to disclose internal cybersecurity protocols.298 The same conclusion 
also follows from a widely recognized purpose of Rule 10b-5, which 
is for Section 10(b) to serve as a “catch-all” provision that covers 
interstitial categories of information that have not been explicitly 
designated by the SEC.299 
On the other hand, defining the duty inquiry as a question of 
whether a line-item disclosure (or any other statement) is 
                                                                                                     
 296. See, e.g., Beaver Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 
F. Supp. 3d 1035, 424, 426 (D. Minn. 2015) (reasoning that press releases and 
other public statements [such as WSJ interviews] actionable under 10b if 
materially misleading (citing Shaw and other 1st Circuit cases)); see also Karmel, 
supra note 261, at 786 (“The line-item disclosures of Regulation S-K are mandated 
and do not depend on an independent judgment by registrants as to their 
materiality.”). In fact, there does not even need to be a statement. As the Court 
has recently held, actions taken by management can be deceptive under Rule 
10b-5 as well. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 
U.S. 148, 158 (2008) (finding no need even for a statement: “If this conclusion 
were read to suggest there must be a specific oral or written statement before 
there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b–5, it would be erroneous. 
Conduct itself can be deceptive, as respondents concede”). 
 297. In other words, although the SEC does not provide line item categories 
of information that a CEO must disclose during an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal, investors may nonetheless sue under Section 10(b) if her responses to 
the reporter are deceptive due to the fact that they leave out certain pieces of 
relevant information.  
 298. The nondisclosure of cyber-security threats that were the basis for fraud 
actions against Target and other companies took place before the SEC had issued 
any guidance as to whether or where those topics must be included in a firm’s 
periodic filings See Karmel, supra note 261, at 812 (discussing the Target 
“debacle” and “other high-profile cybersecurity breaches”).  
 299. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202, 206 (1976) (“The 
section was described rightly as a ‘catchall’ clause.”). If this were not the case, 
there would effectively be immunity for any nondisclosure, no matter how 
deceptive, so long as it does not violate a specific requirement in the securities 
regulations. 
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“misleading” creates a legal obligation that is too broad. This is 
because many line-item rules deal with technicalities that can be 
stated in a misleading manner yet still not provide any plausible 
basis for fraud claims, due to their lack of materiality.300 For 
example, Item 102 of Reg. S-K requires that companies list the 
address of all physical properties owned by the parent entity or its 
subsidiaries; Item 502, meanwhile, mandates that a table of 
contents follow after the cover page of any prospectus document.301 
As these rules suggest, certain SEC line item rules and other 
corners of the securities regulation regime compel the production 
of trivial bits of information. Rule 10b-5, by contrast, does not do 
so, and leaves firms free to remain silent with regard to immaterial 
facts which, if disclosed, would remedy inaccuracies in 
representations that are only of marginal importance.302  
While the foregoing examples highlight the potential blind 
spots in L&G’s conception of the duty to disclose at a relatively 
granular level, the same general oversights are also evident in 
light of the plain language of Rule 10b-5. In relevant part, the rule 
provides that it is “unlawful” to make “any untrue statement of 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
                                                                                                     
 300. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1645 n.18 (“Although the 
rationale for the construction of the various disclosure obligations of companies—
such as their periodic filing obligations in Forms 10-Q and 10-K—is that the 
information is likely to be important to investors, not every piece of information 
required is going to be important in every instance.”). 
 301. See Item 102, 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (2017) (“State briefly the location and 
general character of the . . . physical properties of the registrant and its 
subsidiaries.”); Item 502, 17 C.F.R. § 229.502 (“You must include the table of 
contents immediately following the cover page in any prospectus you deliver 
electronically”; also including front and back page formatting requirements.”).  
 302. A table of contents can be designed in a way that flouts the formatting 
strictures of Item 502 while also giving a false impression of the contents in a 
prospectus, but nonetheless fail to defraud investors. Cf. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. 
v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 38 (2011) (“We were ‘careful not to set too low a 
standard of materiality,’ for fear that management would ‘bury the shareholders 
in an avalanche of trivial information.’” (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224 (1988); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)); 
Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 656 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “decidedly do not prohibit any misrepresentation—
no matter how willful, objectionable, or flatly false—of immaterial fact, even if it 
induces reactions from investors that, in hindsight or otherwise, might make the 
misrepresentations appear material”). 
1022 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957 (2018) 
under which they were made, not misleading.”303 Two features 
characterize the information that Section 10(b) creates a legal 
obligation to disclose. First, the omitted information can relate to 
“any statement.”304 This is consistent with preceding observation 
that, depending on the particular statements at issue in a case, an 
omission may be actionable even if it is unrelated to a line item 
category of information.305 Second, the omitted information must 
render a statement materially misleading in order to be actionable 
as a Section 10(b) claim.306 The key implication here, which also 
confirms the intuition suggested above, is that Rule 10b-5 can only 
be violated by the joint presence of both conditions in the same 
statement (an omission that is misleading as well as material).307 
Therefore, any definition of duty that walls off the question of 
materiality is incomplete.308  
Once the universe of information covered by Rule 10b-5 is 
reframed along these lines, the alleged circuit splits and 
accusations of legal error that swirl around Leidos dissolve away. 
This includes the L&G critique of the Third Circuit’s duty analysis 
in Oran which, upon reexamination, falls short for a number of 
reasons.309 First, once L&G’s insistence on the strict separation 
                                                                                                     
 303. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). 
 304. See id. (stating that it is illegal to make “any untrue statement of a 
material fact”). 
 305. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1647 (discussing the 
treatment of fraudulent omissions). 
 306. See id. at 1644 (discussing the materiality requirement). 
 307. In other words, investors have no securities fraud claim against firms 
that issue statements that withhold material information so long as they are not 
deceptive; neither can they sue firms that issue statements that are misleading if 
they are immaterial. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through 
Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent Disclosure, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 
168–72 (2007) (providing an argument to the same effect); Victor Brudney, A Note 
on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 723, 726 n.10 (1989) (same); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of 
Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 816–25 (1995) (same).  
 308. Reframing the duty to disclose in this manner does not entail a conflation 
of misleading omissions with material omissions, as one reading of L&G might 
suggest. Identifying the conjunction of two sets does not eliminate the distinct 
conceptual properties that define each set.  
 309. Recall, the criticism was that then-Judge Alito’s opinion improperly 
skipped over the duty issue, because it found that the omissions alleged by the 
Oran plaintiffs were immaterial but did not first determine whether they were 
misleading. See supra notes 291–292 and accompanying text (stating that 
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between misleading and material omissions is dropped, it is not 
obvious that Justice Alito’s opinion actually passed over the duty 
question. Instead, a more plausible reading of Oran is that such a 
determination was implicit in the materiality analysis.310 Second, 
because Rule 10b-5 can be violated only by statements that are 
misleading in a material way, a finding that either condition is 
absent will be sufficient to dispose of a claim under Section 10(b).311 
Therefore, even if the Oran opinion skipped over L&G’s narrow 
version of the duty question, the court was not logically required 
to resolve that question in the first place. Third, there is no merit 
to an objection on sequencing grounds.312 In Section 10(b) claims, 
materiality is considered a mixed question of law and fact, which 
means that it can properly be reached at the motion to dismiss 
stage in order to sustain a finding that the pleadings are 
insufficient as a matter of law.313 In short, the argument that 
Justice Alito’s opinion fumbled the duty issue does not hold up; and 
by extension, neither does the stronger claim that Oran illustrates 
a broader analytical disarray in the caselaw relating to Item 303 
and Section 10(b). 
Likewise, the purported split between the Second and Ninth 
Circuits only gains traction when a convoluted theory of the duty 
issue is applied. Here, the decisive passage comes from the Second 
Circuit decision in Stratte-McClure, wherein the court notes that 
                                                                                                     
materiality analyzes whether the particular piece of information would be 
important to the reasonable investor). 
 310. “Materiality” is a concept that deals with magnitudes—it concerns how 
misleading a statement or omission is. A close analysis of something’s magnitude 
often presupposes that it exists. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1644 
(“Materiality refers to the matter of whether a piece of information would likely 
be important to the reasonable investor.”). 
 311. See id. at 1644 (describing materiality as a “central and required” 
element). 
 312. In other words, the idea that although the materiality element may be 
dispositive on an ultimate finding of liability may not precede the duty question 
when a court is asking whether a claim has been stated. 
 313. This was precisely what was done by the district court decision that was 
upheld in Oran. In fact, courts often bypass both the misleading or material 
addressing the question of scienter, which is expressly authorized under terms of 
the PSLRA. See, e.g., Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 633 
n.11 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding dismissal of 10b-5 claim based on failure to plead 
scienter under PSLRA, without reaching other elements of the claim); In re 
NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing Rule 
10b-5 claim on scienter grounds). 
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noncompliance with Item 303 may involve a misleading statement 
that is relevant for purposes of a Section 10(b) claim.314 There are 
two potential interpretations of this language. From one 
perspective, it is an accurate yet entirely innocuous proposition. As 
has been explained, “any statement” can be misleading for 
purposes of Rule 10b-5, and Item 303 do not represent a special 
exception from the general rule that gives MD&A disclosures some 
sort of safe harbor immunity against the prohibition on securities 
fraud.315 In other words, the Second Circuit is restating a truism. 
Under the L&G framework, by contrast, the same passage in 
Stratte-McClure represents the court’s resolution of the duty issue. 
It therefore addresses a mandatory threshold question, and directs 
the decision in that case down a path that will differ from others 
which do not perform a similar analysis. Because the Livingston 
Opinion self-consciously adopts the L&G approach, it misconstrues 
the opinion in NVIDIA and sets the Second Circuit “at odds” with 
a conclusion that no court, including the Ninth Circuit, has ever 
asserted.316  
 
                                                                                                     
 314. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“It follows that Item 303 imposes the type of duty to speak that can, in 
appropriate cases, give rise to liability under Section 10(b).”); see also Langevoort 
& Gulati, supra note 36, at 1645 n.19 (discussing the when omission of certain 
facts may or may not be misleading). 
 315. Materially misleading omissions will often involve noncompliance with a 
line-item requirement, even though the latter is not necessarily required. For one, 
the SEC presumably formulates most disclosure rules in order to cover 
information that is likely to be of interest to investors. See Shaw v. Dig. Equip. 
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996) (“The obligations that attend the 
preparation of [a registration statement and prospectus] embody nothing if not 
an affirmative duty to disclose a broad range of material information.”); see also 
Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1645 n.18 (explaining that, although the 
purpose of disclosure obligations is to inform investors, not all disclosed 
information will always be important). In addition, the fact that the SEC requires 
certain information in a line-item may also lead to self-fulfilling expectations on 
part of investors that such information will be produced. See Oesterle, supra note 
258, at 146 (referring to the “self-enforcing” nature of judicial interpretations of 
SEC line items rules). 
 316. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Leidos case’s cert. petition 
argument regarding a circuit split on the issue presented by Leidos).  
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2. Reframing the Relationship Between Item 303 and 
Section 10(b) 
The duty to disclose rhetoric that appears in Leidos does more 
than encourage some questionable interpretations of the relevant 
precedents. It also distorts the bigger picture perspective on 
securities fraud claims that involve MD&A disclosures. The 
prevailing view seems to be that violation of Item 303 effectively 
serves as a predicate act, which courts must identify in order to 
determine whether a viable Section 10(b) claim has been pled.317 
In reality, there is no particular legal relationship between Rule 
10b-5 and Item 303 beyond the fact that both regulations happen 
to obligate disclosures that look similar in many respects but are 
not identical.  
A notable example, of course, is the rules’ respective 
materiality standards.318 But close parallels appear along a 
number of other dimensions as well: Section 10(b) and Item 303 
have roughly comparable knowledge requirements;319 both 
attempt to draw a distinction between disclosure of verifiable 
historical facts, as opposed to expressions of opinion or 
forward-looking projections;320 and, they may both apply to the 
                                                                                                     
 317. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the relationship between a violation of 
Item 303 and a Section 10(b) claim through discussion of the Leidos case). 
 318. See supra Part II.C (discussing materiality in the context of disclosure 
requirements). 
 319. The scienter standard in Item 303 turns on language that requires the 
disclosure of “known facts.” See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2017) (providing Item 303 
rules which includes language requiring identification or descriptions of “any 
known trends”). Meanwhile, the scienter standard for fraud claims is generally 
understood to be recklessness rather than actual knowledge. See Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) (discussing the court of 
appeals’ decisions allowing the scienter requirement to be met by showing 
recklessness on the part of the defendant). 
 320. See In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870–71 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that there is no rule 10b-5 liability for purely forward-looking statements); 
Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 745–46 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that 
Rule 10b-5 does not apply to statements of opinion that amount to mere puffery); 
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that Rule 
10b-5 does not apply to speculative statements that are only false when viewed 
in hindsight). Compare SEC Rule 175, 17 CFR § 230.175 (providing Rule 10b-5 
safe harbor for forward-looking statements), with SEC 1989 Release, supra note 
73 (providing analogous rule for purposes of Item 303).  
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same underlying disclosure documents.321 In any particular case, 
courts may compare these categories side-by-side, and where they 
find the overlap to be complete, declare that Item 303 has 
“triggered” a Rule 10b-5 cause of action. But no such procedure is 
required—the elements of Section 10(b) stand by themselves, and 
a motion to dismiss must be denied whenever a claim has been 
properly stated under the terms of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act.322 For this reason, the underlying 
complaints in Leidos span hundreds of pages, but only mention 
Item 303 in a few stray paragraphs, if at all.323 Indeed, as one 
practitioner has explained, the inclusion of Item 303 allegations in 
a securities fraud complaint is often considered a minor drafting 
point or throwaway formality.324 
The misunderstood legal relationship between Item 303 and 
Rule 10b-5 has led commentators to overstate the effect that 
particular interpretive decisions in the federal courts may have on 
actual outcomes in securities litigation.325 Even if the caselaw 
draws subtle technical distinctions between the relevant standards 
of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 (regarding materiality, scienter, and so 
on), it is hard to envision a real-life fact pattern that would occupy 
                                                                                                     
 321. This is because Rule 10b-5 claims can be premised on statements made 
in SEC filings in which Item 303 disclosures must appear. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 
1222 (discussing that Rule 10b-5 claim can proceed based on statements made in 
prospectuses and registration statements, in addition to periodic financial 
statements made on a quarterly and annual basis). 
 322. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing 
for dismissal if the pleadings in an action under the statute do not meet all 
requirements set out under the statute). 
 323. See generally Compl., supra note 117 (failing to mention Item 303). See 
Am. Compl., supra note 107, ¶¶ 49–50 (referencing Item 303 in 2 out of 165 
paragraphs). Likely in response to the Second Circuit and SDNY’s unexpected 
focus on the Item 303 issue, there is a slight uptick in its use in the Second 
Amended Complaint. See Second Am. Compl., supra note 138, ¶¶ 5, 13, 403, 444, 
445, 475, 492 (referencing Item 303 in seven of 527 paragraphs).  
 324. See Douglas W. Greene, Why Item 303 Just Doesn’t Matter In Securities 
Litigation, LAW360 (Oct. 13, 2015, 12:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/711040/why-item-303-just-doesn-t-matter-in-securities-litigation (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2018) (arguing that Item 303 lacks value as a practical matter) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 325. See supra Part II (discussing the commentary surrounding the Item 303 
and Section 10(b) relationship and the several cases, specifically Leidos, that have 
dealt with this relationship). 
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the interstitial gap between the two sets of requirements. In other 
words, as a practical matter, an omitted fact that violates Item 303 
will almost always render a statement materially misleading for 
purposes of a fraud claim as well.326 This reality belies claims made 
by the Cert. Petition that recent circuit court opinions, such as 
NVIDIA and Stratte-McClure, have spurred rampant forum 
shopping by plaintiff’s attorneys in securities class actions.327 It 
also means that, for securities plaintiffs who would prefer that 
noncompliance with Item 303 automatically translate into a 
Section 10(b) claim in some mechanical per se fashion, not much 
will be at stake in how the Court decides Leidos.  
A final irony of the duty to disclose debate in Leidos, lost on 
most of the briefing to the Court and academic commentary, is that 
the presence of a legal obligation to disclose information relating 
to MD&A is quite literally not at issue in the case. It is uncontested 
that such a requirement is imposed by the SEC through Item 303 
of Reg. S-K. In the rare (but hypothetically possible) case where 
factual allegations that support a violation of Item 303 do not also 
give rise to a fraud claim under Rule 10b-5, the only upshot is that 
a private enforcement mechanism for that requirement is 
unavailable.328 The SEC can still police noncompliance with its 
MD&A rules through cease-and-desist orders and other forms of 
regulatory supervision.329 Thus, from a policy perspective that 
focuses on the flow of information to capital markets, the kinds of 
disclosures that the securities regulations compel firms to make to 
investors will remain unchanged. 
                                                                                                     
 326. No decision in the caselaw surrounding Leidos finds material 
noncompliance with Item 303 in a way that did not also support a fraud claim, on 
the grounds that the underlying facts were immaterial as matter of law under 
Basic.  
 327. See Leidos Cert. Pet., supra note 3, at 17 (arguing that securities 
plaintiffs have rushed from the Ninth Circuit to the Second Circuit in recent 
years). 
 328. Cf. Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud 
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2208 (2010) (arguing that 
overlapping public and private enforcement is an inefficient way to prevent 
securities fraud). 
 329. See supra Part II.B (discussing the SEC’s power to exercise enforcement 
authority over disclosure requirements violations).  
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C. The Role of the Duty to Disclose in Securities Regulation 
Debate over the precise meaning of the duty to disclose 
doctrine permeates the securities regulation caselaw and has 
inspired a voluminous body of legal scholarship.330 These disputes 
first gained momentum in the seminal insider trading case of 1980, 
Chiarella v. United States,331 where the Court stated that “when 
an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no 
fraud absent a duty to speak.”332 Although the law of insider 
trading generally concerns a set of conduct and legal theories that 
is foreign to securities fraud suits based on misleading corporate 
disclosures,333 the duty language from Chiarella migrated over to 
the conventional fraud context with the Court’s 1988 opinion in 
Basic, where it held that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not 
                                                                                                     
 330. See generally Oesterle, supra note 258 (discussing the meaning of the 
term “material” in securities law); Monsma & Olson, supra note 307, at 168–72 
(arguing that firms cannot be sued for issuing statements that are misleading if 
they are immaterial); Kitch, supra note 307, at 816–25 (same); Jeffrey D. 
Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation’s Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. 
L.J. 935, 936 (1979) (“The extent to which rule 10b-5 imposes a duty to disclose in 
the absence of trading or prior inaccurate disclosure, however, remains relatively 
undefined.”); Alan L. Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule 10b-5: Does a Publicly 
Held Corporation Have an Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 DENV. U. L.J. 
369, 370 (1972) (discussing “material information” and asking under what 
circumstances a corporation has an obligation to disclose such information). 
 331. 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1641 
(“Ever since [the decision in Chiarella], the lower courts have struggled to make 
sense of what the Court meant [in that case regarding the duty to disclose].”); cf. 
Hugh T. Wilkinson, The Affirmative Duty to Disclose After Chiarella and Dirks, 
10 J. CORP. L. 581, 598 (1984) (arguing that the decisions issued after Chiarella 
indicate that “the affirmative duty to disclose retains vitality, and indeed, it 
remains a rather expansive doctrine”). 
 332. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
 333. While insider trading cases are premised on Section 10(b), the federal 
courts did not recognize such claims until more than two decades after Rule 10b-5 
was promulgated. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 
8-3925, 49 SEC Docket 907, at *3–5 (Nov. 8, 1961) (recognizing federal insider 
trading claims through SEC administrative action); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d 833, 848–49 (2d Cir. 1968) (adopting the SEC position), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 976 (1969); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
INSIDER TRADING: A COMPREHENSIVE PRIMER 9–12 (2001), 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jhasbrou/Teaching/POST%202015%20Fall/Material
s/SSRN-id261277.pdf (reviewing the origins of the federal prohibition on insider 
trading). 
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misleading.”334 The way that the duty to disclose has been 
conceived in Leidos is typical of a broader theoretical approach to 
the issue, and is therefore revealing of some of the more 
dysfunctional aspects that apply to those debates in general.  
The L&G analysis is a useful starting point in this respect, as 
it once again provides the clearest articulation of the duty analysis 
that is adopted in much of the relevant caselaw and broader 
commentary on the case. L&G define the parameters of any proper 
theory of the duty to disclose by explaining that it must be 
consistent with the “two foundation stones in the securities 
disclosure architecture.”335 Those are that: “First, not all material 
information has to be disclosed [and] [s]econd, immaterial 
information is often required to be disclosed (although not under 
Rule 10b-5).”336 The otherwise subtle parenthetical regarding Rule 
10b-5 holds the key to this argument—why should a definition of 
the legal obligation to disclose information under Rule 10b-5 turn 
on requirements that are nowhere provided in that regulation but 
instead belong to other areas of the securities law? The unstated 
assumption here is that the “duty to disclose” is a unified principle 
that must be derived from a comprehensive view of the securities 
law “architecture” as a whole. This is a fairly representative view. 
A hallmark of the judicial and scholarly response to Chiarella and 
Basic is to take the Court’s language at face value by seeking to 
define a duty to disclose in the abstract, and then resolve 
particular legal questions in a way that fits with the underlying 
logic of the more general concept.337 
A broader lesson of this article’s analysis is that the leading 
approach to the duty question runs into serious theoretical and 
practical difficulties. The most obvious problem is that it produces 
poor results. As employed in Leidos, the relevant conceptual 
categories do not map well onto the interaction between Item 303 
and Section 10(b), do not provide persuasive critiques of the 
                                                                                                     
 334. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (discussing the 
requirement that a statement be misleading to be actionable). 
 335. Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1644–45. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See Bauman, supra note 330, at 949 (discussing that there are ways to 
inform corporations how to act while providing courts with information to 
determine good faith efforts to comply with the duty to disclose given 
uncertainties in duty to disclose requirements).  
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relevant caselaw, and often draw attention to sources of 
disagreement that are nonexistent or merely superficial. In other 
words, Leidos illustrates the hazards of tackling the duty question 
based on principles by showing how such an analysis can quickly 
make an easy case seem very hard.  
An alternative to the abstract conception of the duty to 
disclose has been provided in the analysis of Section 10(b) and Item 
303 that is presented directly above.338 The basic procedure is to 
determine the timing and content of any given disclosure duty by 
grounding the question in the specific legal authorities at issue—
whether they be statutory provisions, regulatory rules, statements 
in the legislative history, or interpretive guidance released by the 
SEC. This framework differs from that of L&G and the Second 
Circuit’s Livingston Opinion in that it treats duty as a localized 
concept that varies across different portions of the securities 
regulation architecture, rather than as a metaphysical object 
which hovers above it.339 The advantage of a more particularized 
approach to duty is that it can reduce apparently complicated legal 
or policy questions into much simpler terms, and highlights the 
fact that “[t]o focus on a duty to disclose in the abstract . . . would 
be to miss the obvious in favor of the obscure.”340 
The deeper theoretical weakness of an abstract approach to 
the duty to disclose question relates to an equivocation over the 
term “duty” as it is used in securities law. In the insider trading 
context, the duty to “speak” mainly reflected a prohibition on 
certain kinds of securities transactions, and had little to do with 
                                                                                                     
 338. See supra Part V.B.2 (comparing the standards, rules, and requirements 
of Item 303 and Section 10(b) violations and claims under each cause of action). 
 339. See Neach, supra note 6, at 757 (“A detailed look at the various liability 
provision that a novel concept—reading the statutes and rules themselves—can 
help to clear at least some of the confusion [relating to Item 303].”); see also 
Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories, 269 F.3d 806, 807–11 (7th Cir. 2001) (detailing 
the universe of regulatory mandates for disclosure). But cf. Donald C. Langevoort, 
Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 87, 125 (1999) (questioning whether securities regulation framework 
provides sufficient guidance regarding when disclosures must be made on a 
continuous rather than periodic basis).  
 340. See Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(explaining that the main issue in the case is not whether there was an abstract 
duty to disclose but whether there was a specific obligation to disclose the relevant 
information).  
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financial disclosures per se.341 Instead, when Chiarella and related 
insider trading precedents invoked the duty concept, those courts 
were referring to the state law of fiduciary duties that applied to 
corporate officers and certain other employees as agents of a 
corporation, and grafting those fiduciary obligations onto the 
federal securities law.342 Thus, the “duty” was employed as a term 
of art that was borrowed from the common law of agency, tort, or 
contract.343 As such, the term mapped onto the common law idea 
that heightened legal duties could arise from the presence of 
certain special relationships.344 
                                                                                                     
 341. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 333, at 43 (arguing that it is the act of insider 
trading rather than nondisclosure which provides the basis for imposing liability); 
Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 353, 353 (1988) (discussing the abstention versus disclosure view of insider 
trading). 
 342. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) 
(discussing the duty of confidentiality for corporate agents); see also BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 333, at 39–40 (discussing state law’s influence on federal law in 
fiduciary duty and insider trading questions); Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 
36, at 1654–55 (discussing the Supreme Court’s intrusion into state fiduciary law 
in Chiarella); Theresa A. Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The 
Common Law of Federal Securities Regulation, 20 J. CORP. L. 155, 157 (1994) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s use of state law to decide federal cases). 
 343. See Ronald C. Wyse, A Framework of Analysis for the Law of Agency, 40 
MONT. L. REV. 31, 32–33 (1979) (explaining the distinction between the common 
law of agency, tort, and contract); Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring 
an Historical Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 104 
COM. L.J. 168, 179–88 (1999) (discussing disclosure requirements under the 
various bodies of common law). 
 344. The duty question also had unique significance as a procedural matter. 
In the common law tort of negligence, for example, the duty determination was 
understood to enjoy lexical priority over other steps in the judicial analysis, 
because it was considered a pure question of law. Other elements of a negligence 
claim—such as breach, materiality, and reliance—were usually framed as raising 
pure questions of fact and therefore not properly resolved at the pleading stage. 
See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and 
the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 667–68 n.38 (2001) 
(discussing the potential procedural differences between two formulations of 
negligence, one which includes and one which does not include reference to duty); 
Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1501, 1501 (2007) (arguing that an economic analysis can explain the concept of 
duty and provide a theory of tort law). Securities fraud actions have at times been 
analogized to common law fraud, a tort historically known as “deceit.” See Steven 
A. Fishman, Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5 in Face-to Face Transaction, 12 J. 
CORP. L. 251, 262 n.79 (1986) (comparing state common law and federal securities 
law with respect to liability for nondisclosures). However, duty was not an 
element of those claims at common law, because deceit was an intentional tort, 
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By contrast, when courts refer to duty in the context of private 
securities class actions alleging wrongful nondisclosures, the term 
does not carry the same common law implications.345 Instead, 
“duty” functions as a synonym for whatever legal “requirement,” 
“mandate,” or “obligation” is established under the particular 
statutory or regulatory authority that a plaintiff has invoked as a 
cause of action in that case. In other words, for determining the 
applicability of disclosure requirements in the securities laws—the 
only function of which is to legally obligate the disclosure of 
information—an invocation of the duty to disclose is a tautological 
formulation that does not serve an independent role in the legal 
analysis.346 As illustrated in Leidos, the main stumbling block in 
                                                                                                     
like battery, and therefore did not require a plaintiff to plead any particular 
relationships to the defendant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977) (providing the elements required to impose liability for 
fraudulent misrepresentations); see also Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and 
Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449, 454 (2012) (providing the 
elements of a claim of deceit which does not include a duty or relationship 
requirement); Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790–1860: Continuity Amidst 
Change, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 407–08 (1995) (same). For that reason, the 
“half-truth doctrine”—which provides a cause of action under common law fraud 
for alleged omissions—does not implicate the “duty” element which otherwise 
forms a part of claims in connection with unintentional torts, at least not as it is 
traditionally understood. 
 345. See Omnicare v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 
1318, 1330 n.9 (2015) (explaining that Section 11 is “not coextensive with 
common-law doctrines of fraud”); Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008) (“Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law 
fraud into federal law.”); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 
375, 381, 388–89 (1983) (explaining that one of the purposes of federal securities 
laws was to address and fix issues found in the common law); cf. Edward A. 
Fallone, Section 10(B) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law, 1997 ILL. L. 
REV. 71, 104 (“Although it is difficult to find a consistent pattern in the Court’s 
approach to definite the elements relevant to a 10b-5 action, one recurring theme 
has been the occasional judicial relaxation of elements drawn from the common 
law of fraud.”); Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 
10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 137 
(1985) (“The Supreme Court has accorded common law deceit a limited role in 
interpreting rule 10b-5 . . . . The Court has disregarded common law deceit 
principles where the statute’s language, history, structure, or policy are 
dispositive.”). 
 346. Although this circularity is acknowledged in pockets of the scholarly 
literature, it is usually noted in passing, and treated as a peculiar yet harmless 
framing mechanism which courts recite before introducing their substantive 
analysis. See, e.g., Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer’s Duty Under Rule 10b-5 to 
Correct and Update Materially Misleading Statements, 40 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 
289, 293 (1991) (calling the standard tests for when there is a duty to disclose 
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taking an abstract approach to the duty to disclose is that, by 
freighting the duty analysis with significance that it does not have, 
courts and scholars lose sight of the disclosures which are 
compelled by the legal authorities that are actually on point. 
VI. Conclusion 
By taking up Leidos for its October 2017 Term, the Court put 
itself on course to address a set of statutory and regulatory 
authorities that are at the heart of the securities law framework. 
As this article has argued, however, even before its settlement, 
Leidos did not present the Court with an opportunity for resolving 
any split among the circuit courts of appeals as to how the 
relationship between those authorities should be interpreted. The 
consensus in the caselaw is that a failure to comply with the 
MD&A disclosure requirements in Item 303 of Reg. S-K may in 
many circumstances also constitute an actionable claim for 
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5,347 but it does not automatically 
do so in every instance. The reason is that the materiality 
standards in the two regulations differ slightly. Since none of the 
federal court decisions on point have taken a position to the 
contrary, the Court would likely have upheld the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Liedos on those same grounds.  
This argument carries broader implications because it cuts 
against essentially all other extant readings of the issues raised by 
Leidos. In the academic scholarship, there is a uniform impression 
that Leidos will force the Court to confront an intractable 
disagreement over how much disclosure firms are required to 
provide to investors under federal law. Moreover, the relevant 
judicial opinions have often expressed the same conclusion, despite 
their underlying substantive agreement. Because the thesis of this 
article is that such an interpretation is radically incorrect, what is 
really at stake when considering the issues presented by Leidos is 
                                                                                                     
“circular”); Monsma & Olson, supra note 307, at 167 (same). 
 347. See supra Part III (discussing whether and when an Item 303 violation 
can constitute a Section 10(b) violation and ultimately concluding that it can but 
that a violation of Section 10(b) is not inevitable just because of the presence of 
an Item 303 violation). 
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a proper understanding of how the securities regulation regime 
operates at a fundamental, systemic level.  
The Article’s larger contribution therefore consists of 
identifying the two sources of confusion that have led the courts 
and academic literature astray in this area. First, the disclosure 
obligations imposed under Reg. S-K must be analyzed by 
approaching the twin pillars of the securities law framework, the 
33 Securities Act and 34 Exchange Act, from an integrated 
perspective that identifies the common elements across those 
statutes. Although the anti-fraud prohibition under Rule 10b-5 has 
a number of unique features, the tendency to view Section 10(b) of 
the 34 Exchange Act in isolation from related provisions in the 33 
Securities Act often leads to logically inconsistent interpretations 
of both statutes. Second, the central role granted to the “duty to 
disclose” in securities law is misplaced, because the application of 
that doctrine in cases involving nondisclosure claims simply begs 
the question. As a result, theoretical disputes over the precise 
meaning of the duty to disclose distract from the real legal issues 
presented, more often than not, and are best left unopened. The 
overarching claim of this Article is that, once these two 
misunderstandings are remedied, a more coherent picture of how 
federal securities regulation works will follow.  
